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RELIGION LESSONS FROM EUROPE: 
INTOLERANT SECULARISM, PLURALISTIC 
NEUTRALITY, AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
Antony Barone Kolenc* 
ABSTRACT 
Case law from the European Court of Human Rights demonstrates 
to the U.S. Supreme Court how a pluralistic neutrality principle 
can enrich the American society and harness the value of faith in 
the public sphere, while at the same time retaining the vigorous 
protection of individual religious rights.  The unfortunate 
alternative to a jurisprudence built around pluralistic neutrality is 
the inevitability of intolerant secularism—an increasingly militant 
separation of religious ideals from the public life, leading 
ultimately to a repressive society that has no room in its 
government for religious citizens.  The results of intolerant 
secularism are seen in a recent series of negative cases decided by 
the European Court, which illustrate how highly secularized 
nations can trample the fundamental rights of religious citizens for 
the sake of secular ideals.  The Supreme Court can avoid this type 
of intolerance in the United States by distancing itself from the 
principle of strict neutrality that the Court often has repeated in its 
Establishment Clause cases.  A better path for the Supreme Court 
is to emulate a series of positive cases from the European Court 
that demonstrate pluralistic values.  These cases show the value 
that religion can bring to public life, and the ability of progressive 
                                                            
* Antony Barone Kolenc (J.D., University of Florida College of Law) is an 
Associate Professor of Law at Florida Coastal School of Law, where he teaches 
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grateful to the scholars at the 11th Circuit Legal Scholarship Forum at Stetson 
University College of Law for their helpful comments on this Article, especially 
Professors Michael Finch and Ronald Krotoszynski. 
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nations to welcome religious diversity into the public square 
without harming individual rights.  The net result of this shift in 
the Supreme Court’s focus—without sacrificing the value and 
purpose of the Establishment Clause—would be to promote the 
cause of religious pluralism in the United States, and to enhance 
the dignity of the American people to live out their religious faith 
in the community insofar as they choose (or do not choose) to do. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Post-Christian Europe—a secular, liberal society that is seen 
as increasingly faithless1—has a few lessons to teach the United 
States (“U.S.”) Supreme Court about the value of religion in modern 
society.  Recent cases from the European Court of Human Rights 
(“European Court”) show that progressive, pluralistic nations can 
tolerate religion in the public sphere without doing violence to 
individual rights.  Under the European case law, for instance, nations 
may spend tax dollars on church projects, display religious symbols 
in government buildings, and teach children about God in public 
schools.  These types of European cases may be instructive in 
rethinking the U.S. Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause2 
jurisprudence to create a more pluralistic neutrality principle for the 
future.  
 
Likewise, the European system demonstrates the dangers of 
an increasingly intolerant strain of secularism that tramples personal 
religious expression in the name of secular values.  For instance, 
under recent secular-based rulings from the European Court, Muslim 
teachers cannot wear headscarves in Swiss public schools, Orthodox 
Jewish butchers cannot access slaughterhouses in France, Christian 
workers cannot claim conscience protection with regard to same-sex 
marriage in the United Kingdom, and Islamic women may not wear a 
                                                            
1 See Christianity and Church Attendance: The Future of the World’s 
Most Popular Religion is African, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 25, 2015), 
https://www.economist.com/news/international/21684679-march-christianity-
future-worlds-most-popular-religion-african (noting dismal statistics of church 
closings as “European priests and ministers are preaching to ever-emptier 
pews”); see also Justice Antonin Scalia, Address at the 2007 Dinner at the 
Waldorf-Astoria, ORD. MALTA AM. ASSOC. (Nov. 9, 2007), 
https://orderofmaltaamerican.org/files/pages/0124-
newsletter_hospitallers_17_justice_scalia.pdf (calling modern Europe “totally 
non-Christian”).  
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cls. 1-2. The first and second clauses of the 
First Amendment state: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Id. The first 
portion of that sentence is known as the Establishment Clause; the remaining 
words are known as the Free Exercise Clause. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss1/2
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burqa in public in Belgium.  These negative cases also can assist in 
adjusting the Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence so that 
intolerant secularism does not strangle religious liberty in the United 
States. 
 
This Article argues that the Supreme Court can stay truer to 
constitutional principles by embracing a more moderate 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause—a pluralistic neutrality 
principle.  Pluralism refers to “a state of society in which members of 
diverse . . . religious . . . groups maintain and develop their traditional 
culture . . . within the confines of a common civilization.”3  In the 
context of the Establishment Clause, a more pluralistic neutrality 
principle would officially recognize the unique societal value of 
religion and would permit the diversity of the nation’s faiths to 
enrich the public sphere.  This Article also contends that the Supreme 
Court’s modern interpretation of the Religion Clauses has embraced 
an unnecessarily strict model of neutrality, which is nurturing an 
intolerant secularism that harms religious freedom.  These 
contentious topics have been debated at the Supreme Court and in 
the scholarly literature for decades.  This Article’s primary 
contribution to that debate is its emphasis on pluralism and its focus 
on European cases as a source of comparison and illumination. 
 
Part II of this Article briefly sets forth two opening 
principles: (1) that religion cases from the European Court can be 
validly compared with the U.S. Supreme Court’s religion 
jurisprudence, and (2) that religious freedom is critical in modern 
pluralistic societies.  Part III argues that the Supreme Court’s religion 
jurisprudence sometimes has embraced an overly strict form of 
neutrality, which naturally leads to the type of intolerant secularism 
seen in some European nations.  Then, using recent cases from the 
European Court, Parts IV and V examine how the Supreme Court 
can avoid the European Court’s acceptance of an intolerant 
secularism that has trampled religious freedoms in some European 
countries, while benefiting from a European-style pluralistic 
                                                            
3 Pluralism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed.), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pluralism (last visited Aug. 25, 
2017). 
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neutrality principle.  This Article concludes that the Supreme Court 
should moderate its treatment of the Religion Clauses by adopting 
more pluralistic European sensibilities.   
II. OPENING PRINCIPLES: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
The cases decided by the United States Supreme Court and 
the European Court of Human Rights have been instrumental in both 
helping and hindering religious freedom in the United States and 
Europe.  Part II examines why Europe is a good point of reference 
for the U.S. Supreme Court on this issue, and explores why religious 
freedom is worthy of protection as a key element in democratic 
societies. 
A. The European Court of Human Rights 
Before delving into the subject matter of this Article, it is 
necessary to mention why comparing the case law of the U.S. 
Supreme Court and the European Court is a valid undertaking.  
Although some have questioned the propriety of the Supreme Court 
consulting foreign precedent,4 the author of this Article has 
previously defended at length the validity of this practice in the area 
of religion and the European Court, when done within cautious 
limits.5  In short, although cases from foreign jurisdictions are not 
                                                            
4 See Austen L. Parrish, Note, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Use of Foreign Law, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 637 (2007); Harlan Grant 
Cohen, Note, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 273 (2006). 
5 See Antony B. Kolenc, Note, Putting Faith in Europe: Should the 
U.S. Supreme Court Learn from the European Court of Human Rights?, 45 GA. 
J. INT’L L. & COMP. L. 1 (2016). In that article, the author presents a full 
explanation for why comparing the religion case law of the European Court and 
the U.S. Supreme Court is a valid endeavor. The author considers policy-based 
objections to the practice of citing foreign precedent, explores whether 
differences between the systems in the U.S. and Europe invalidate the 
comparison, and considers whether the subject matter of religion makes such 
comparisons futile. The author concludes that there is value in consulting the 
European Court’s religion jurisprudence. Id. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss1/2
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binding on the Supreme Court, they may shed light on practices and 
problems that parallel those seen in the United States.  As Justice 
Breyer has argued, cases that emanate from other developed 
democracies may “cast an empirical light on the consequences of 
different solutions to a common legal problem.”6 
 
Considering the kinship of the United States and European 
nations, it makes sense to turn to Europe for a natural point of 
comparison.  This is especially true of the European Court of Human 
Rights.  Located in Strasbourg, France, the European Court provides 
a unique vantage point from which to view the religion issue.7  It 
interprets the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”),8 helping to guarantee freedom of 
religion across Europe.  The primary source of religious freedom 
under the ECHR is Article 9, which states: 
 
1.  Everyone has the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change 
his religion or belief and freedom, 
either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and 
observance. 
2.  Freedom to manifest one’s religion 
or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
                                                            
6 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
7 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, arts. 20, 23(1), 26(1), 38, 41, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 
[hereinafter ECHR]. The Court consists of one judge from each member-state of 
the Council of Europe, appointed to nine-year, non-renewable terms. It acts in 
single-judge decisions, three-judge committees, seven-judge Chambers, or a 
seventeen-judge Grand Chamber, and functions as both an appellate court and a 
trial court. Id. 
8 See generally ECHR, supra note 7. The ECHR—a human rights 
constitution—may be “the most important element in the protection of human 
rights in Europe.” Lord Goldsmith, A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and 
Principles, 38 COMMON MAR. L. REV. 1201, 1209 (2001).  
7
50 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 1N 
 
limitations as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public 
order, health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.9 
 
Article 9’s approach to religion approximates much of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause case law, which applies 
a mere rational basis scrutiny to neutral, generally applicable statutes 
that do not target religion.10  This is similar to the European notion of 
affirming laws that are “necessary,” such as those involving “public 
safety” and “public order, health or morals.”  Notably, Article 9 lacks 
an Establishment Clause; however, that does not nullify the 
comparisons with the Religion Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.  
Indeed, the European Court has developed a “neutrality principle” 
similar to—but more moderate than—that used by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence.11  Moreover, even 
though it decides relatively few religion cases in its vast docket,12 the 
European Court grapples with many of the same religion issues that 
confront the U.S. Supreme Court.  In short, the points of similarity 
justify the comparison.   
                                                            
9 ECHR, supra note 7, art. 9. 
10 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990). 
11 See Kolenc, supra note 5, at 23-24. 
12 From 1959 to 2009, the European Court noted 30 freedom of 
religion, thought, and conscience violations; however, “during that same forty-
year period, the Court found some 4008 violations . . . concerning the fairness 
and length of proceedings.” John Witte, Jr. & Nina-Louisa Arold, Lift High the 
Cross?: Contrasting the New European and American Cases on Religious 
Symbols on Government Property, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 5, 14-15 (2011) (2d 
ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2010) (citing Pub. Relations Unit, 50 Years of Activity: 
The European Court of Human Rights – Some Facts and 
Figures (2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Facts_Figures_1959_2009_
ENG.pdf); see also RUTH MACKENZIE, CESARE ROMANO & YUVAL SHANY WITH 
PHILIPPE SANDS, THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 35. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss1/2
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B. The Unique Value of Religion and Religious Freedom 
Religion is unique among the fundamental human rights, 
holding a special position in Western Civilization, Europe, and the 
United States, in particular.  Religious exercise is the nation’s “first 
freedom,” occupying a place of “preferential treatment” in the 
Constitution’s Bill of Rights.13  This noble lineage traditionally has 
earned religion the right to be treated with respect and protected by 
the state. 
 
Various societal rationales support religion and religious 
freedom—most important, religion is valuable in its own right 
because it uniquely concerns “spiritual goods” and involves the 
individual’s place in the universe in relation to a “divine or 
transcendent authority.”14  In other words, religion is worthy of 
protection for its own sake—it alone embraces the divine, spiritual 
dimension of humanity, catering to the universal principles that have 
animated human culture since the dawn of Man.15  Because religion 
lays claim to the Divine, men and women throughout history have 
been willing to die for it in the face of worldly persecution.  Some, 
no doubt, would add that people also have been willing to go to war 
in the name of religion; however, that fact only emphasizes why a 
pluralistic approach to religion and government is necessary to keep 
the peace in a free, democratic society. 
 
Less religious rationales have also been put forth to support 
the value of religion and religious freedom: (1) a “civic virtue 
rationale” that sees religion as instilling “in citizens the moral values 
of traits of character necessary in a democratic social order;” (2) a 
“personal autonomy rationale” that emphasizes “the importance of 
religion to matters of personal choice and identity;” (3) a “civil strife 
rationale” that notes how religious freedom helps “curb the 
                                                            
13 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 
384, 400 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
14 Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in 
Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 218 (1991). 
15 See generally MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE 
(Willard Trask trans., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1987) (tracing the historical 
manifestations of the divine from primitive to modern times). 
9
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dissension and social conflict that issues of religion have historically 
provoked;” (4) a “non-alienation rationale” that finds in religious 
freedom a tool to help “citizens who adhere to minority religious 
faiths or to none at all . . . feel like full members of the political 
community;” and (5) a “pluralism rationale” that seeks a robust 
religious freedom to ensure “a diversity of faiths, thereby 
strengthening American pluralism.”16 
 
Much has been written in the past century about the 
significance of religious freedom.  For the purposes of this Article, 
three points are sufficient to highlight why religion is beneficial, 
desirable, and even necessary to the success of constitutional 
democracies.   
 
First, with regard to the United States, the founding 
generation intended religion to play an important role in making the 
American experiment a success.  This Article will not recount in 
detail the repeated arguments by the scholars and Supreme Court 
Justices who have set forth the historical case for religion’s accepted 
role in official government actions.17  As a sampling of this historical 
sentiment, recall that John Adams famously declared that the 
Constitution would only be successful if it governed “a religious and 
moral people;”18 the first Congress in 1789 believed that “religion, 
morality and knowledge” were “necessary to good government and 
the happiness of mankind;”19 and, when it came time for the 
                                                            
16 Smith, supra note 14, at 197 (discussing the various theories and 
their scholarly underpinnings). 
17 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 885-912 (2005) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Zorach v. 
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
18 Letter from John Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade of the 
Third Division of the Militia of Massachusetts (Oct. 11, 1798) (on file with the 
National Archives). 
19 See Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of 
the River Ohio, 1 Stat. 50-53 (July 21, 1789) (reenacting the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787, which contained the quoted language in Article III of its 
text). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss1/2
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Founders to identify America’s fundamental rights, freedom of 
religion topped the list—not freedom of conscience.20  Moreover, to 
support ratification of the Constitution without a Bill of Rights, 
James Madison argued at the Virginia Convention that the pluralistic 
nature of society would protect religious freedom from government 
oppression.21  As Justice Scalia stated: “Those who adopted our 
Constitution . . . believed that the public virtues inculcated by 
religion are a public good.”22  Some contend, however, that the 
evidence is not conclusive on this point.23 
 
Second, religion has provided civilization with a solid 
foundation for its most cherished human rights24 and secular 
                                                            
20 See Antony B. Kolenc, Not “For God and Country”: Atheist Military 
Chaplains and the Free Exercise Clause, 48 U.S.F. L. REV. 395, 406-08 (2014) 
(discussing the Congressional debate about the drafting of the Religion Clauses). 
21 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical 
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1479 
(1990) (quoting Madison’s argument that pluralism “arises from that 
multiplicity of sects which pervades America, and which is the best and only 
security for religious liberty in any society; for where there is such a variety of 
sects, there cannot be a majority of any one sect to oppress and persecute the 
rest”); see also 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 330 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 
1836). 
22 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 
384, 400 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
23 See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 878–79 (2005) 
(cataloguing contrary historical evidence and arguing that “there was no 
common understanding about the limits of the establishment prohibition, and 
[Justice Scalia’s] conclusion that its narrower view was the original 
understanding stretches the evidence beyond tensile capacity”). 
24 See J.H.H. Weiler, Note, Freedom of Religion and Freedom From 
Religion: The European Model, 65 ME. L. REV. 759, 767 (2013) (noting 
historian, Remy Brague’s, finding that human rights “do not only derive from 
the Enlightenment, Neo-Kantianism, and the French Revolution,” but that they 
also have “always drawn” from religious sources). 
11
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values.25  It was no accident that Thomas Jefferson referenced God 
when he wrote the Declaration of Independence, proclaiming: “All 
men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain 
inalienable rights.”26  This appeal to a transcendent Creator 
highlights the transformational benefit that religion brings to the table 
in affirming human rights: “A transcendent source means that the 
rights apply to everyone, even those who seem most alien, and that 
society must take the utmost care when it treads close to these 
rights.”27  Yet, some scholars today “define human rights and 
religion in adversarial terms,” eschewing the religious foundation of 
human rights and replacing it with purely secular bases.28 
 
Third, accepting religion into the public arena as an 
appreciated contributor to policy, education, and civic discourse 
promotes democratic values.  Far from ushering in theocracy, this 
openness to faith enhances pluralism and diversity.29  For instance, 
the U.S. Supreme Court, while noting the “Christian foundations of 
the nation,” also recognized the nation’s “respect for freedom of 
                                                            
25 See Aaron R. Petty, Note, Religion, Conscience, and Belief in the 
European Court of Human Rights, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 807, 816-17 
(2016) (recounting the role of Christianity in developing human rights and 
secular values in Europe); Lori G. Beaman, Note, Battles Over Symbols: The 
“Religion” of the Minority versus the “Culture” of the Majority, 28 J. L. & 
RELIGION 67, 91-92 (2012-13) (noting the close connection between the 
religious and secular). 
26 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
27 Thomas C. Berg, Can State-Sponsored Religious Symbols Promote 
Religious Liberty?, 52 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 23, 30, 32 (2013) (noting that 
religious duty has value because it relates to an “authority above temporal 
rulers”). 
28 Zachary R. Calo, Note, Pluralism, Secularism and the European 
Court of Human Rights, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 261, 272-73 (2010-11) (arguing 
that religion has become an obstacle to human rights, and is no longer their 
source or solution). 
29 See Michael Scaperlanda, Secular Not Secularist America, 33 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 569, 582 (2011) (“Those who claim that America is in 
danger of theocracy misperceive the nature of theocracy, disagree with the 
policy preferences of a certain set of Christians, or, more likely, both.”). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss1/2
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religious practice that extended to other faiths as well.”30  This lesson 
of tolerance is true today even in those European nations with an 
established religion.  For instance, many “deeply faithful” Europeans 
reject the idea of a hostile secular society and would “prefer to live in 
a country of pluralism that grants a more complete freedom of public 
behavior even if [they] belong to a minority and have to support the 
predominance of an established religion.”31   
 
 In sum, religion has served a valuable and unique role in 
society, which should make it an indispensable partner in good 
democratic government. 
III. THE NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE AND INTOLERANT SECULARISM 
 Although religious exercise historically has held an honored 
place in the hierarchy of rights—“more important than most or 
perhaps all other human goods”32—religion around the world has 
come under increasing attack in the past century by an intolerant 
secularism.  The Supreme Court has fueled this secularism in the 
United States through an inconsistent invocation of a strict neutrality 
principle in the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  
 
 Neutrality is the touchstone of religion jurisprudence in both 
the U.S. Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights.  
Scholars have defined “neutrality” as “the quality or attitude of one 
who maintains a distance from parties in a conflict.”33  But what does 
that term mean in the context of state neutrality toward religion?  
Does it require a stricter form of neutrality that removes all aspects of 
religion from the public square for fear of offending non-adherents, 
or does it allow for a more pluralistic neutrality principle that values 
                                                            
30 Berg, supra note 27, at 34 (citing Holy Trinity Church v. United 
States, 143 U.S. 457, 458-59 (1892)); see also McConnell, supra note 21, at 
1421 (discussing the state of religious diversity at the nation’s founding). 
31 See Pierre-Henri Prélota, The Lautsi Decision as Seen from 
(Christian) Europe, 65 ME. L. REV. 783, 786 (2013); see also Berg, supra note 
27, at 34. 
32 Smith, supra note 14, at 154-55. 
33 Rafael Palomino, Note, Religion and Neutrality: Myth, Principle, 
and Meaning, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 657, 658 (2011). 
13
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the contributions of the spiritual as well as the secular goods in 
society?   
 
Part III of this Article explores the concept of neutrality in the 
religion jurisprudence of the United States and Europe, and it 
discusses how strict neutrality between church and state will 
naturally lead to an intolerant form of secularism that harms religious 
liberty.   
A. The Neutrality Principle 
In 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court created the neutrality 
principle in Everson v. Board of Education (“Everson”), declaring 
for the first time that the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment requires that government at the federal and state level be 
“neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and 
nonbelievers.”34  Since that time, in the name of this neutrality 
principle, the Court has created an inconsistent mess that has left its 
“Establishment Clause jurisprudence in shambles.”35  The Court’s 
confused case law in this area has increasingly separated religious 
faith from the public square, especially as the lower courts have 
applied those precedents.  In the process, the Court has strayed from 
the Clause’s original meaning.36  
                                                            
34 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
35 Utah High. Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 565 U.S. 994 (2011) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); see also Peter G. Danchin, Suspect 
Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of Religious Freedom in International 
Law, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 33-34 (2008); William P. Marshall, The Lautsi 
Decision and the American Establishment Clause Experience: A Response to 
Professor Weiler, 65 ME. L. REV. 769, 771 (2013).  
36 Some scholars see little modern value in ascertaining the original 
meaning of the Constitution. See Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy 
of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and the Future of the 
Establishment Clause, 100 N.W. U.L. REV. 1097, 1103 (2006); Alexandra D. 
Furth, Note, Secular Idolatry and Sacred Traditions: A Critique of the Supreme 
Court's Secularization Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 594 (1998); Micah 
Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1401 
(2012). That debate exceeds the scope of this Article, which assumes the 
original meaning should play a part in determining the proper boundary of the 
Clause. 
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This modern separationist interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause ostensibly finds its roots in colonial-era thinkers, such as John 
Locke,37 and Evangelical Christian leaders, such as Isaac Backus and 
Roger Williams.38  But Locke was not a strict separationist—he 
favored both governmental encouragement and financial support of 
state religion.39  And while a few in the founding generation may 
have preferred a more robust church-state separation,40 even those 
voices would not recognize the world formed by today’s 
Establishment Clause.  
 
Nor did the Founders subscribe to the idea of strict neutrality 
between religion and non-religion—meaning that the government 
must remain entirely distant from religion.  Justice Joseph Story’s 
influential commentary on the U.S. Constitution reported that, at the 
time of the Clause’s adoption, “the general, if not the universal, 
sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive 
encouragement from the state, so far as was not incompatible with 
the private rights of conscience, and the freedom of religious 
                                                            
37 See Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 570-71 (citing John Locke, A 
Letter Concerning Toleration, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A 
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 211, 226 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003)) (“[T]he 
church itself is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth.  
The boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable.”). 
38 These figures favored a separation “to strengthen religion, not 
marginalize it.” Marshall, supra note 35, at 778 (noting that Williams believed 
aid would “weaken churches by fostering their dependence upon government 
and subjecting them to ‘worldly corruptions’”); see also Scaperlanda, supra note 
29, at 573 (noting Jefferson’s similar belief). 
39 McConnell, supra note 21, at 1433; see also Scaperlanda, supra note 
29, at 571-72 (noting the Constitution rejected Locke’s “intolerance of 
Catholics, Muslims, and atheists . . . by stating that ‘no religious Test shall ever 
be required’”).  
40 George Mason, Virginia Declaration of Rights, in THE COMPLETE 
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 1.1.3.15.d 
(“[I]t is contrary to the principles of reason and justice that any should be 
compelled to contribute to the maintenance of a church with which their 
consciences will not permit them to join.”); THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE: 
ADDRESSED TO THE INHABITANTS OF AMERICA 36 (1792) (“Persecution is not an 
original feature in any religion; but it is always the strongly marked feature of all 
religions established by law.”). 
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worship.”41  Most of the founding generation, including George 
Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison, 
recognized that the nation’s liberty required that its government have 
some relation with religion in general.42   
 
Further, some criticize the Everson Court’s decision to 
incorporate the Establishment Clause against the states, turning it 
into a vehicle for individual rights.  They argue that the original 
purpose of the Clause was to protect states from federal intrusion, 
providing a “space of self-determination in the field of religious 
freedom.”43  Thus, some states legitimately continued to have 
established state religions for decades after the Clause’s 
                                                            
41 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1865, 1868 (1833) (noting that any state attempt to “hold all 
[religions] in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation”); 
see also Smith, supra note 14, at 150-66 (discussing the Framers’ religious 
justifications for government). 
42 See Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 573; see also Andrea Pin, 
(European) Stars or (American) Stripes: Are the European Court of Human 
Rights’ Neutrality and the Supreme Court’s Wall of Separation One and the 
Same?, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 627, 633 (2011). As President, both Jefferson and 
Madison took actions to support a traditional understanding of the Clause. See 
Christine Leigh Heyrman, The Separation of Church and State from the 
American Revolution to the Early Republic, NAT’L. HUMAN. CTR., 
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/eighteen/ekeyinfo/sepchust.htm (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2016) (Jefferson approved Congressional chaplains, granted 
“financial aid to Protestant missions,” attended worship services in Congress, 
and “called upon Americans to join him in prayer.”); see also Thomas E. 
Buckley, S.J., Thomas Jefferson and the Myth of Separation, in RELIGION AND 
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, 46-48 (Mark J. Rozell & Gleaves Whitney eds., 
2017) (Jefferson permitting Marine Band to play in church, allowing religious 
groups to worship in federal buildings, and advocating for religion among the 
Native Americans); see also James Madison, Annual Prayer Day Proclamations, 
in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE 458-61 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark 
David Hall ed., 2009) (collecting Madison’s annual prayer day proclamations).  
43 See Pin, supra note 42, at 628-29; see also Daniel O. Conkle, The 
Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal 
Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 1-2 (2000). The limited 
scope of the Clause is evidenced by its rare invocation from the time of its 
ratification in 1791 until 1947. See Witte & Arold, supra note 12, at 31.  
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ratification.44  Justice Clarence Thomas and others have noted that 
the Everson Court’s decision to incorporate the Clause45 was 
unreflective;46 however, the Court does not seem ready to reverse 
course on that matter.  
 
The Supreme Court’s incorporation of the Clause opened the 
“floodgates of litigation”—nearly 70 cases under the Clause over the 
next 60 years, compared to only three cases in the prior 150 years.47  
This resulted in a cascade of policy-based judicial decisions that 
increasingly became disconnected from the Clause’s original 
                                                            
44 See McConnell, supra note 21, at 1436-37; Rupal M. Doshi, Note, 
Nonincorporation of the Establishment Clause: Satisfying the Demands of 
Equality, Pluralism, and Originalism, 98 GEO. L.J. 459, 467 (2010) (citing Carl 
H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the 
Early American Republic, 2004 B.Y.U L. REV. 1385, 1458 (2004)) (noting that 
Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, and some New England states maintained 
congregational establishments, with Massachusetts finally abandoning its 
establishment in 1833). 
45 The Court simply concluded that, because other parts of the First 
Amendment had been broadly incorporated against the states, and due to the 
“interrelation of these complementary [Religion] clauses,” there was “every 
reason to give the same application and broad interpretation to the [Clause].” 
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). The Court cited only to Thomas 
Jefferson’s 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists, describing the purpose of the 
Clause as erecting “a wall of separation between church and state.” Id. at 16 
(citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)).   
46 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing the Clause should be “unincorporated”); Mary 
Ann Glendon, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 481 (1991) 
(noting “how little intellectual curiosity the members of the Court demonstrated 
in the challenge presented by the task of adapting, for application to the states, 
language that had long served to protect the states against the federal 
government”); see also Doshi, supra note 44, at 462 (citing ROBERT L. CORD, 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 
15 (1982), and MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: 
RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 23-27 
(1965)) (against incorporation). 
47 See Witte & Arold, supra note 12, at 31; see also Doshi, supra note 
44, at 471 (citing Cochran v. La. Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 375 (1930) 
(upholding state purchase of nonreligious school books for students in parochial 
schools); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 82 (1908) (upholding payments to 
a Roman Catholic school on an Indian reservation); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 
U.S. 291, 299-300 (1899) (upholding congressional payments to benefit the poor 
at a religious District of Columbia hospital). 
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purpose.  Indeed, the Clause has evolved to the point where noted 
scholars, such as Erwin Chemerinsky, can declare today without a 
hint of irony that the Clause “is about preventing the majority, 
through government power, from making members of other religions 
feel unwelcome”—a theory of non-alienation that was foreign to the 
Clause prior to 1980s.48  Of course, the idea that a pluralistic culture 
should welcome people of all faiths rings true as a matter of social 
policy; but, as a rule of constitutional interpretation, it lacks roots.   
 
The Court opened the door to more litigation when it 
concluded that the portion of the Clause that included the words, 
“respecting an establishment,” required a strict judicial eye to prevent 
even the slightest step in the direction of an establishment.49  This 
slippery slope has led to judicial intrusion into even the slightest local 
decisions.  Moreover, with no real moorings, the Court’s 
jurisprudence has drifted aimlessly among various tests—neutrality, 
Lemon, history and tradition, endorsement, coercion—resulting in a 
herky-jerky precedent that provides few principled tools for lower 
federal courts to determine when government action violates the 
Establishment Clause.50  Predictably, confused lower courts have 
become hyper-vigilant in policing state actions that historically posed 
                                                            
48 Erwin Chemerinsky, A Fixture on a Changing Court: Justice Stevens 
and the Establishment Clause, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 587, 601-02 (2012); see also 
Claudia Haupt, Active Symbols, 55 B.C. L. REV. 821, 829 (2014) (quoting Lynch 
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (“[T]he harm 
against which the Establishment Clause is designed to protect is ‘send[ing] a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community.’”); but see Smith, supra note 14, at 210 (explaining that 
this rationale had “developed over the last decade” as “an effort to avoid the 
failings of the . . . civil strife rationale”). 
49 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (“A given law 
might not establish a state religion, but nevertheless be one ‘respecting’ that end 
in the sense of being a step that could lead to such establishment.”). 
50 See Antony B. Kolenc, “Mr. Scalia’s Neighborhood”: A Home for 
Minority Religions?, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 819, 831-35 (2007) (discussing 
various theories under the Clause); see also Haupt, supra note 48, at 829 
(discussing the “coercion” approach, which would “find a practice with 
‘coercive impact’ unconstitutional”). 
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little danger to establishing an official religion.51  The result has been 
the subversion of the democratic process52 and a string of 
inconsistent rulings.53  Remarkably, these flaws have not stopped this 
jurisprudence from influencing Europe. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has assimilated some 
of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, even 
though Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms contains no limitation on established 
churches.  In fact, key European nations—Denmark, Iceland, 
Norway, the United Kingdom, and others—continue to have 
                                                            
51 See Selman v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist., 449 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(invalidating sticker on biology text that noted “evolution is a theory”); Skoros 
v. City of New York, 437 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2006) (removing crèche, but allowing 
Jewish and Muslim symbols); Carpenter v. Dillon Elementary Sch. Dist. 10, No. 
04-35088, 2005 WL 2271720, at *647 (9th Cir. 2005) (banning individual from 
giving secular message at school function because of known affiliation with 
Christianity); Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach Cty., 387 F.3d 1208, 1211 
(11th Cir. 2004) (upholding school’s removal of religious symbols in student 
mural); Fleming v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(upholding school ban on religious text or symbols on painted tiles hung within 
Columbine High School to commemorate shooting victims); Harris v. City of 
Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1402 (7th Cir. 1991) (striking down two city emblems 
because they portrayed religious imagery); Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 
1505, 1518 (D. Colo. 1989) (prohibiting teachers from being seen reading or 
possessing their own Bibles at school). 
52 See Marshall, supra note 35, at 775-76. 
53 Professor McConnell has compellingly demonstrated how this mess 
of Establishment Clause cases has made it “constitutional for a state to hire a 
Presbyterian minister to lead the legislature in daily prayers, but unconstitutional 
for a state to set aside a moment of silence in the schools for children to pray if 
they want to. It is unconstitutional for a state to require employers to 
accommodate their employees’ work schedules to their sabbath observances, but 
constitutionally mandatory for a state to require employers to pay workers 
compensation when the resulting inconsistency between work and sabbath leads 
to discharge. It is constitutional for the government to give money to religiously-
affiliated organizations to teach adolescents about proper sexual behavior, but 
not to teach them science or history. It is constitutional for the government to 
provide religious school pupils with books, but not with maps; with bus rides to 
religious schools, but not from school to a museum on a field trip; with cash to 
pay for state-mandated standardized tests, but not to pay for safety-related 
maintenance.” Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 
U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 134 (1992).   
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officially established religions.  Still, the European Court has created 
and enforced a neutrality principle from the language within Article 
9, and some scholars have argued that the European Court should go 
even further in mandating a stricter rule.54  The major impediment to 
a strict neutrality principle in Europe is the “margin of appreciation” 
doctrine developed by the European Court.  This is a principle of 
deference to sovereign member-states based on the concept of 
“subsidiarity,” which places primary responsibility for respecting the 
ECHR with the member-states and allows the European Court to 
intervene “only where the domestic authorities fail in that task.”55  
Under these principles, the European Court has accepted that no 
single model of church-state relations is “embedded in the European 
Convention.”56  The net result of this policy is the European Court’s 
frequent deference to member-states and its tolerance of a variety of 
practices along the spectrum of policies: from strict neutrality in 
nations like France to established religions in countries like the 
United Kingdom. 
 
The European Court’s development of a neutrality principle 
may be a blessing in disguise—a source of illumination for the U.S. 
Supreme Court, as this Article argues more fully below.  Perhaps the 
European Court can repay the Supreme Court’s contributions to 
Europe in-kind, pointing the way to a more sensible interpretation of 
the U.S. Establishment Clause. 
B. Strict Neutrality and Intolerant Secularism 
Although the European Court has adopted a moderated 
version of the neutrality principle, the U.S. Supreme Court has sent 
mixed signals about the kind of neutrality the Establishment Clause 
                                                            
54 See generally Alicia Cebada Romero, The European Court of Human 
Rights and Religion: Between Christian Neutrality and the Fear of Islam, 11 
N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 75 (2013). 
55 European Court of Human Rights [Eur. Ct. H.R.], Interlaken Follow-
Up: Principle of Subsidiarity - Note by the Jurisconsult, at para. 2 (Aug. 7, 
2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2010_Interlaken_Follow-
up_ENG.pdf. 
56 Pin, supra note 42, at 640-41. 
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requires.  The Supreme Court has flirted at times with a stricter form 
of neutrality, where the “government cannot utilize religion as a 
standard for action or inaction.”57  The Court’s dicta in Everson first 
referenced this idea, noting that the state may not “aid one religion, 
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”58  The Court 
has come closest to practicing strict neutrality in its cases involving 
public schools and religious displays on government property, as 
detailed below. Still, strict separationists—those who desire a 
complete separation between church and state to be vigorously 
enforced by the courts—believe the Court has not gone far enough in 
applying a strict neutrality principle.59   
 
The Supreme Court has not been consistent in applying strict 
neutrality in the hard cases,60 yet its Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence treats the concept as black-letter law.  The Court has 
stated that the “touchstone” of its Establishment Clause analysis “is 
the principle that the ‘First Amendment mandates governmental 
neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and 
nonreligion.’”61  To that, a frustrated Justice Scalia responded, 
“[H]ow can the Court possibly assert that . . . ?  Who says so?  Surely 
not the words of the Constitution.  Surely not the history and 
traditions that reflect our society’s constant understanding of those 
                                                            
57 S. Kathleen Pepper, The Strict Neutrality Principle: Workable 
Solution for First Amendment Challenges to Preservation Designation of 
Religious Landmarks?, 15 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 3-4 (1991) 
(citing PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE 
AND THE SUPREME COURT 112 (1962)). 
58 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). 
59 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 688–89 (2002) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (lamenting the Supreme Court’s continued loosening of 
its Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and noting that the Majority’s “espoused 
criteria of neutrality in offering aid, and private choice in directing it, are shown 
to be nothing but examples of verbal formalism”). 
60 For instance, the Court has entirely ignored the neutrality principle in 
the context of legislative prayer. See Town of Greece. v. Galloway, 134 U.S. 
1811 (2014); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
61 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); see 
also J. Judd Owen, The Struggle between “Religion and Nonreligion”: 
Jefferson, Backus, and the Dissonance of America's Founding Principles, 101(3) 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 493, 493 (2007) (noting that this version of neutrality is an 
embrace of John Rawls’s doctrine of “political liberalism”).  
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words.”62 
 
In reality, the consistent application of strict neutrality by the 
Supreme Court would lead to the victory of an intolerant secularism 
that could never be neutral toward religion.  This is because strict 
neutrality fancies itself to be fair and impartial, but it is “fair” to a 
very great fault.  It suffers from the same malady that Justice John 
Paul Stevens famously criticized in applying strict scrutiny review in 
equal protection cases: it cannot tell “the difference between a ‘No 
Trespassing’ sign and a welcome mat.”63  In other words, strict 
neutrality cannot distinguish between the types of government 
interaction with religion that benefit society and the kind that pose a 
danger (to both religion and government).  Thus, it would suppress 
all interaction. 
 
 Moreover, it is impossible for strict neutrality to be truly 
neutral toward religion.  This can be demonstrated with a logical 
exercise.  As defined earlier, “neutrality” is “the quality or attitude of 
one who maintains a distance from parties in a conflict.”64  Thus, 
referees are neutrals because they can maintain distance between 
themselves and both sides on the playing field.  To begin this 
exercise, the parties must be identified.  One may be tempted to label 
the parties as “church” and “state,” recalling Thomas Jefferson’s 
famous (but problematic65) phraseology; however, if those are the 
two parties, then the state (as a neutral) must maintain a distance 
from itself (as a party), which is clearly not possible.  The parties’ 
identities must be found elsewhere.   
 
 The Supreme Court itself has identified the parties involved 
                                                            
62 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 889 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
63 Adarand Constrs. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (Stevens, J. 
dissenting) (arguing that strict scrutiny cannot discern between benign and 
invidious discrimination). 
64 Palomino, supra note 33, at 658. 
65 See Weiler, supra, note 24, at 760 (arguing the church-state 
dichotomy is “a creature of the French and American Revolutions, which . . . 
conflates State with Nation”). This language also adds tension between the 
Religion Clauses and “prevents development of a single test that would allow 
the two clauses to be read together harmoniously.” Pepper, supra note 57, at 6. 
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by stating that the touchstone of the Establishment Clause is 
neutrality between “religion and religion” and “religion and non-
religion.”  The first of these two scenarios is partly achievable in 
theory because it involves state neutrality between two religions.  
Here, the state might find strict neutrality because it can “maintain a 
distance” between itself and each religion, not preferring one over 
the other.  For instance, the state as a neutral would not provide a 
program for Jews, to the exclusion of Catholics, because that action 
would align itself with Jews over Catholics.  Even this first scenario 
raises problems, however, as illustrated by the debate between 
Justices Souter and Scalia about whether the state can acknowledge 
God in monotheistic terms.66  
 
Much more problematic is the second scenario, involving 
strict state neutrality between religion (in general) and non-religion.  
If this simply means the state may not prefer religion over atheism, 
or vice versa, then perhaps this works just as well (or as poorly) as 
the first scenario’s theoretical construct.  Except that, during the 
entire history of the nation, the state has aligned itself with religion 
by assuming the existence of a Creator who cares about the fate of 
the nation and who has endowed humankind with inalienable 
rights.67  As the Court declared in Zorach v. Clauson (“Zorach”): 
“We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being.”68  
 
                                                            
66 In the context of a Ten Commandments display, the Justices 
discussed whether it would be impossible for the state to maintain neutrality 
between monotheists and nonmonotheists when government “invokes God.” 
Compare McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 879-80 (criticizing Scalia for allegedly 
suggesting that “government should be free to approve the core beliefs of a 
favored religion over the tenets of others”), with id. at 899-900 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (noting the state can invoke “God”—a monotheistic concept—
despite offending “nonmonotheists” because “governmental invocation of God 
is not an establishment”). 
67 Aleksandra Sandstrom, God or the Divine is Referenced in Every 
State Constitution, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Aug. 17, 2017), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/17/god-or-the-divine-is-
referenced-in-every-state-constitution/ (“God or the divine is mentioned at least 
once in each of the 50 state constitutions and nearly 200 times overall.”). 
68 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). 
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The true problem with the second scenario, however, is that 
the Supreme Court does not view “non-religion” simply as atheism.  
Instead, the Court has conflated non-religion with the concept of 
“secularism,” which is defined as “the belief that religion should not 
play a role in government, education, or other public parts of 
society.”69  The Court has taken the position that the state must not 
act in a way that intends to, or primarily does, benefit religion in 
general.70  Under this test, the only permissible activity in the public 
sphere becomes secular activity, and the state’s de facto position 
becomes one of secularism.  That being the case, how can a “secular” 
state logically maintain strict neutrality between the parties of 
religion and secularism?  It cannot.  The state can never maintain a 
distance from religion without aligning itself with secularism; nor 
can it maintain a distance from secularism without aligning itself 
with religion.71   
 
Further, secularism cannot be neutral toward religion because 
it is an absolute-value, zero-sum system that requires religion to be 
kept private, out of the public square and the schools and the halls of 
power.72  Secularism is not pluralistic,73 nor can it embrace spiritual 
gods along with secular ones in public works; to the contrary, it sees 
                                                            
69 Secularism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed.), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/secularism (last visited Nov. 3, 
2017). 
70 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
71 See McConnell, supra note 53, at 134 (noting that one side of the 
Supreme Court’s view accepts a “role for religion in public life [if] . . . religious 
institutions sacrificed their distinctively religious character.”).   
72 See Robin W. Lovin, Religion and Political Pluralism, 27 MISS. C. 
L. REV. 91, 104 (2007-08) (also noting that this is “a trivialization of religious 
life”). 
73 See generally John Breen, Neutrality in Liberal Legal Theory and 
Catholic Social Thought, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 513 (2009) (challenging 
the idea of liberal neutrality); see also Owen, supra note 61, at 493 (questioning 
whether the Court’s position is “cogent” in asserting that “liberal principles” can 
be “neither religious or secular, but instead some third sort of thing—in Rawls’s 
term, simply ‘political’”); Marshall, supra note 35, at 777 (finding secularism to 
be “religiously-laden as it depends upon a particular view of the relationship 
between church and state that comports with the beliefs of some religions but 
not others”). 
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secular values as superior to religious ones.74  If left unchecked, it 
becomes increasingly intolerant, with adherents of both majority and 
minority religions eventually marginalized by secular exclusivity and 
denied “access to certain occupations, charitable work, and other 
basic public goods, relegating diverse ways of life to an ever 
shrinking private realm.”75  In the end, it leads to the “disintegration” 
of the individual.76  
 
To illustrate, the next part will demonstrate how intolerant 
secularism has affected the religious rights of some Europeans 
through some of the worst cases to emerge from the European Court 
of Human Rights—negative lessons from Europe for the U.S. 
Supreme Court.   
IV. NEGATIVE LESSONS FROM EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN COURT AND 
INTOLERANT SECULARISM 
This Article has argued thus far that the consistent application 
of a strict neutrality principle under the Establishment Clause would 
lead to an intolerant secularism that would stifle religious expression 
in the United States.  That result would be unfortunate, especially in 
light of the critical role that religion and religious freedom have 
played in the success of the American experiment as a constitutional 
republic.  Further, this Article has suggested that the Supreme Court 
can take lessons from how the European Court of Human Rights has 
                                                            
74 See McConnell, supra note 53, at 191-92 (also finding irony in the 
claim that “liberal, democratic, nonsectarian positions have superior 
constitutional status to religious ones” because that claim itself is “illiberal 
(since it denies the people’s right to determine what will bring about the good 
life), undemocratic (since it conflicts with the democratic choices of the people), 
and sectarian (since it is based on a narrow point of view on religious issues)”); 
see also Lovin, supra note 72, at 94 (arguing that a normatively pluralistic 
society must show “mutual respect . . . [and] civility toward religious practices 
and observances, even from those who . . . are skeptical of the social value of all 
of them”). 
75 Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 576-77. 
76 Id. at 575-79 (The secularist state “requires an unnatural separation 
of the self-identified religious person’s core from their public persona, causing a 
disintegration of the person. . . . [They] simply cannot think and act in a manner 
consistent with secularism’s demand that they act as if God did not exist.”). 
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adjudicated similar religious freedom issues.  Not all of those lessons 
are positive, however, and some cases exist to assist the Supreme 
Court in avoiding the mistakes of the European Court. 
 
Part IV of this Article first notes the varied church-state 
arrangements adopted by European nations, to include those with a 
form of intolerant secularism.  It then discusses the European Court’s 
difficult position attempting to referee disputes that pit secular values 
against religious ones, and it examines cases where the Court has 
failed to protect individual religious rights in the face of an 
unyielding secularism.  Finally, this part suggests a few lessons that 
the Supreme Court can draw from those cases to avoid a similar 
problem in the United States. 
A. The European Court: Frustrated Referee of Neutrality 
The European Court is the protector of religious liberty 
within the Council of Europe, comprised of nations with varied 
governing structures and church-state relationships—some with long, 
distinguished histories.  For instance, the United Kingdom’s 
(sometimes-troubled) marriage of church and state has stood for 
centuries as a point of pride for the people of Great Britain, where 
“the many Catholics, Muslims and Jews, not to mention the majority 
of atheists and agnostics” are “equal citizens” who genuinely 
consider the Queen to be their own, even though she is also “the 
titular Head of the Church of England.”77  But some European 
nations have taken the opposite approach, separating church from 
state to different degrees.  
 
Recall that the European Court has determined that no single 
model of church-state relations is “embedded in the European 
Convention.”78  In practical terms, this means that the 47 member-
states that comprise the Council of Europe are generally free under 
the ECHR to structure their church-state relationships as they see 
                                                            
77 Weiler, supra note 24, at 764.   
78 Pin, supra note 42, at 640-41. 
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fit.79  Some of those nations have tragic, bloodied histories where 
religion has factored into wars and genocides.80  Thus, for some 
member-states, the idea of state neutrality toward religion is a 
concept with life-and-death ramifications.  This reality has caused 
some nations to take a harder stance on the separation of church and 
state.   
 
By working with these nations over time, the European Court 
has gathered valuable experience with the disparate approaches taken 
in the struggle for state neutrality toward religion.  This neutrality 
often is connoted by the French term, “laïcité,” or the Spanish word, 
“laicidad”—both without direct English translation, but which refer 
to a form of religious neutrality, maybe even secularism.81  France 
stands out as the paradigmatic nation that most values its strong 
secular government, evincing outright hostility toward religion in the 
public square.82  Similarly, Turkey uses a strict form of laicidad “as a 
                                                            
79 “More important than separation of church and state, in the view of 
the European Court of Human Rights, is that the state provide religious freedom 
for all.” Melissa Curvino, Note, Church-State Cooperation Does Not Violate a 
Guarantee of Religious Freedom: A Study of the 1978 Spanish Constitution and 
1979 Concordat with the Catholic Church, 27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 509, 560 
(2013) (recognizing the legitimacy of non-neutral “[s]tate actions that do not 
infringe on the right of citizens to worship freely”). 
80 See Petty, supra note 25, at 807-08 (noting more recent European 
“attempts at exterminating substantial parts of populations identified by their 
religious difference: Armenian Christians, Ashkenazi Jews, and Bosnian 
Muslims”). 
81 See Michel Troper, Sovereignty and Laïcité, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2561, 2563 (2009) (“Laïcité cannot be completely defined by the usual idea of 
an absence of influence of religion on the State or, as it is sometimes said, by a 
separation between State and religion. But it can also be characterized as an 
attitude of the State towards religion, decided unilaterally by the State.”). 
82 See Weiler, supra note 24, at 763-64 (France is “neutral as between 
different religious factions in the French public space. But it is not neutral in a 
broader political sense. . . . The only things that may not be displayed, 
independently of the contemporary color of voter preference, are a cross, a 
mezuzah, or a crescent.”); see also Rebecca E. Maret, Left Hanging: The 
Crucifix in the Classroom and the Continuing Need for Reform in Italy, 35 B.C. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 603, 608-09 (2012) (noting that the French system 
ensures freedom of religion and preserves “a political body free from the 
influence of any one religious doctrine”). 
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breakwater against the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.”83  Other 
nations, such as Spain and Italy, try to maintain neutrality while also 
respecting the place of religion in public life.84  The Vatican also has 
advocated for a positive form of neutrality so that citizens may live 
out their faith “in the public sphere.”85   
 
It is important to recognize that even member-states with 
established state religions (e.g., the United Kingdom) have taken 
strong measures in modern times to separate temporal from religious 
authority and to promote secular values.86  Indeed, many nations with 
established religions go out of their way to encourage “neutrality” in 
public life, except where necessary to maintain their ceremonial 
establishments, which are more a part of their past culture than their 
present religious practice.87  Thus, the mere existence of an 
established church does not necessarily reflect the level of secularism 
promoted by the nation’s civil government.  
 
The European Court must resolve religion cases emerging 
from all these diverse church-state arrangements.  As a result, the 
Court has become a referee of the disputes between the forces of 
secularism and those who desire religious participation in public life.  
The ability of the European Court to protect religious freedom has 
been partly frustrated, however, by its need to apply a wide “margin 
of appreciation” in these cases.  This deference requires the Court to 
                                                            
83 Palomino, supra note 33, at 661-62. 
84 Frederick Mark Gedicks & Pasquale Annicchino, Cross, Crucifix, 
Culture: An Approach to the Constitutional Meaning of Confessional Symbols, 
13 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 71, 98-99 (2014) (discussing how Italian laicità differs 
from the French and American models). 
85 Palomino, supra note 33, at 662 (quoting Pope Benedict XVI’s 
advocacy for a ‘laicidad positiva’ in Italy). 
86 See Petty, supra note 25, at 813-15 (noting historical need to separate 
temporal and religious power in Europe). 
87 For instance, the United Kingdom, like much of Europe, has had 
steadily declining church attendance, according to surveys. See Report of the 
Commission on Religion and Belief in British Public Life, WOOLF INST. 89 (Dec. 
7, 2015), https://corablivingwithdifference.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/living-
with-difference-community-diversity-and-the-common-good.pdf (“The 
percentage of people who say they do not attend religious services rose from 49 
per cent in 1990 to 56 per cent in 2010.”). 
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uphold a member-state’s action unless it conflicts with the ECHR 
directly or with the European consensus on a particular issue of 
religious freedom.88  The net result of this deferential policy is the 
Court’s toleration of a variety of offending practices taken in the 
name of secularism.   
 
Truth be told, part of the explanation for these poor results is 
that the European Court itself largely has embraced secular values, 
sometimes accepting the notion that religion is “more a problem . . . 
than a solution,” and that religious pluralism can be sacrificed in 
“cases that challenge the predominance of this secular narrative.”89  
This is especially the case in decisions where the “threat” of religion 
conflicts with secular values under the ECHR, which the European 
Court implies are “more important to the human rights agenda” than 
religious freedom.90   
 
A sampling of cases in the next section demonstrates how 
intolerant secularism in Europe has trampled the rights of religious 
persons (often from minority religions) in the name of secular values.  
These cases stand as negative examples where the European Court’s 
compromised and frustrated position has caused it to fail in its 
mission to protect religious liberty in Europe. 
B. Europe’s Toleration of Intolerant Secularism 
This section will discuss four paradigmatic cases where the 
European Court has failed to protect religious liberty in the face of 
intolerant secularism.  To understand the situation better, consider 
the steps taken by the European Court to adjudicate Article 9 claims 
under the ECHR: 
 
                                                            
88 European Court of Human Rights [Eur. Ct. H.R.], Interlaken Follow-
Up: Principle of Subsidiarity - Note by the Jurisconsult, at para. 2 (Aug. 7, 
2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2010_Interlaken_Follow-
up_ENG.pdf. 
89 Calo, supra note 28, at 268. 
90 Carolyn Evans, Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the 
European Court of Human Rights: Cracks in the Intellectual Architecture, 26 
J.L. & RELIGION 321, 341 (2010-11). 
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[T]he Court will assess: (1) whether 
there is interference with that right; 
(2) whether this interference was 
based on law; and (3) whether this 
interference was necessary in a 
democratic society.  It is usually the 
third step, the balancing test by the 
Court, which is the focus of most 
cases.  There the judges analyze 
whether the interference corresponds 
to a pressing social need, is 
proportionate to the aim pursued, and 
is justified by relevant and sufficient 
reasons.91 
 
The third step of the Court’s Article 9 analysis is also the 
place where the judges weigh the importance of the secular values at 
stake against the desire for religious expression.  This is where the 
European Court sometimes falls short, undervaluing religion relative 
to secular beliefs.  Indeed, when that Court has failed to protect 
religious pluralism, it has done so “where religion challenges 
Europe’s secular identity in a manner that the Court deems 
threatening.”92 
 
The first two example cases involve France, to which the 
European Court regularly defers without questioning that country’s 
“elevated position of secularism.”93  The “neutrality” of this 
secularism is intended in theory to result in the fair and even-handed 
treatment of religion by the state.  In reality, however, the strict 
separation between church and state often places France at odds with 
its people on matters of religious practice—especially the wearing of 
                                                            
91 Witte and Arold, supra note 12, at 16. 
92 Calo, supra note 28, at 264 (citing to cases involving Muslim 
headscarves). 
93 Id. at 336 (discussing the Court’s tendency to defer to the 
representations of longstanding members of the ECHR). 
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holy garb.94  This results in conflict between French secular values 
and the religious practices of minority adherents who wish to live 
according to their rules of faith.  As these cases demonstrate, the 
European Court appears to identify with the secular values of French 
culture, prizing them above the deeply held religious values of 
politically powerless individuals.   
 
In S.A.S. v. France (“S.A.S.”), the most controversial case in 
this area, the European Court upheld a French ban on the wearing in 
public of any item that covers the face—a not-so-veiled attack on 
Islamic clothing, such as the burqa worn by some Muslim women.95  
The European Court first rejected France’s justification that the 
burqa ban protected women from symbols of gender oppression.96  
On this point, France was not helped by the fact that the applicant (a 
feminist Muslim woman) insisted she wore the burqa by choice, 
based on her own religious feelings at any given time.97  This placed 
France in the odd position of arguing that it was promoting gender 
equality as a means of protecting women “from the exercise of their 
own fundamental rights and freedoms.”98  The Court also found 
France’s asserted national security rationale to be weak, unlike in 
some other cases.99  Instead, the European Court applied the margin 
of appreciation principle to uphold the ban on a much weaker legal 
                                                            
94 See, e.g., Mann Singh v. France, App. No. 24479/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2008) (finding a Sikh’s complaint “manifestly ill-founded” after he was denied 
a driver’s license due to his wearing of a turban in a photo, based on France’s 
interest in public safety and due to the increased risk of fraud and forgery of 
driving licenses). 
95 S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 163 
(2014). 
96 See id. para. 119.  
97 Id. paras. 11-12. 
98 Id. para. 119. 
99 Compare id., with Ahmet Arslan & Others v. Turkey, App. No. 
41135/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) (The Court ruled against secular Turkey’s 
conviction of 127 Turks who violated an anti-terrorism law about “the wearing 
of headgear and . . . religious garments, in public other than for religious 
ceremonies.” Although the Court found a violation of Article 9, it noted that it 
would have “accepted, particularly given the importance of the principle of 
secularism for the democratic system in Turkey, that this interference pursued 
the legitimate aims of protection of public safety,” except Turkey never offered 
that justification in the case.). 
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theory based on society’s secular values.   
 
Specifically, the S.A.S. Court found that the ban protected 
“the rights and freedom of others” by furthering the secular good of 
“social communication”—a “principle of interaction between 
individuals” that was “essential for” pluralism, “tolerance and 
broadmindedness.”100  In this sad irony, in the name of tolerance, the 
European Court accepted the intoleration of a diverse religious 
minority’s desire to express its faith in public in a peaceful, non-
threatening manner.  The case—already a precedent for cases from 
Belgium101 and Switzerland102—shows how difficult it is for a strict-
neutrality system to be truly neutral toward religion, especially where 
secular values clash with religious ones and the state chooses sides 
against religion. 
 
In a second French case—Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. 
France (“Cha’are Shalom”)—the European Court again upheld 
French values in rejecting a challenge from the applicant, an ultra-
orthodox Jewish group.103  To further its animal cruelty laws, France 
had denied the group a license to use a state-approved facility for the 
ritual slaughter of its own meat, in compliance with Jewish “glatt” 
kosher standards.104  France had already licensed a much larger 
Jewish association to use the slaughterhouse, and it claimed that the 
nation’s secular goal of minimizing animal cruelty would be 
                                                            
100 S.A.S., App. No. 4385/11, para. 153. 
101 Similar Muslim veil laws were upheld in Belgium on the same 
secular principles as in S.A.S. v. France. See Dakir v. Belgium, App. No. 
4619/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017); see also Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, App. 
No. 37798/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017).  
102 See Osmanoǧlu & Kocabaş v. Switzerland, App. No. 29086/12, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (2017) (citing S.A.S v. France, App. No. 4385/11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014)) 
(finding no violation in a school’s refusal to exempt Muslim girls from 
compulsory mixed swimming lessons, despite interference with religious 
freedom, due to margin of appreciation and secular aim of protecting foreigners 
from social exclusion). 
103 Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 
para. 88. 
104 Id. para 32 (“For meat to qualify as ‘glatt’, the slaughtered animal 
must not have any impurity, or in other words any trace of a previous illness, 
especially in the lungs.”). 
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furthered by avoiding “a proliferation of approved bodies” to conduct 
ritual slaughtering105—a position that, in reality, did not help even a 
single animal.106  France insisted that the group either purchase its 
glatt meat from another country (Belgium), or obtain it from the 
already-licensed Jewish association, despite the group’s insistence 
that the association did not sufficiently comply with glatt standards to 
fulfill their deeply religious obligations.107 
 
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Cha’are Shalom 
case was that France ignored the group’s assessment of its own 
religious beliefs, finding instead that the group’s ritual slaughtering 
was “only religious in an accessory way.”108  France also argued that 
the group’s religious beliefs included only the eating of the “glatt” 
meat, not necessarily the slaughtering of it.109  Incredibly, the 
European Court fully approved this characterization of the group’s 
beliefs, noting that Article 9 did not “extend to the right to take part 
in person in the performance of ritual slaughter” where the applicant 
could obtain and eat the needed meat.110  The Court’s value 
judgment about this religious slaughtering was improper because 
“only the religious community has the competence to define and to 
interpret its religious beliefs and their implications for its religious 
freedom.”111  This case illustrates again that secularism cannot 
remain neutral toward religion where secular values clash with 
religious ones, even where, as here, France’s position would do little 
to further its goal of protecting animals from cruelty. 
 
A similar disturbing result occurred in Dahlab v. Switzerland 
                                                            
105 Id. para. 69. 
106 The same number of animals would be slaughtered in the same 
slaughterhouse, whether done by the politically powerful Jewish association or 
the smaller orthodox applicant.  No animals would be saved or treated less 
cruelly.  
107 See id. paras. 81-82. 
108 Id. para. 69.   
109 Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 
para. 64. 
110 Id. para. 82. 
111 Gerhard Robbers, Church Autonomy in the European Court of 
Human Rights--Recent Developments in Germany, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 306 
(2010-11). 
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(“Dahlab”), where secular education regulations prevented a female 
teacher (a Swiss Catholic convert to Islam) from wearing an Islamic 
headscarf (hijab) while teaching students in a public school class, 
even where she had not discussed religion with the students.112  A 
chamber of the European Court accepted Switzerland’s view that the 
hijab was a “powerful external symbol” of religion that might have a 
“proselytizing effect” on “the freedom of conscience and religion of 
very young children.”113  Moreover, unlike in S.A.S., both the 
Government and the European Court found the headscarf offensive 
to the secular value of “gender equality.”114  Citing the margin of 
appreciation, the Court found the application inadmissible, and it 
affirmed that the Swiss could “protect the right of State school pupils 
to be taught in a context of denominational neutrality.”115  The 
Dahlab case reveals that secular systems cannot tolerate a religious 
“good” (i.e., individual expression of faith) where it clashes with a 
secular “good” (i.e., the state’s view of “gender inequality”).116  This 
unyielding “neutrality” is typical in secular systems.117   
 
 Finally, in the consolidated case of Eweida and Others v. 
The United Kingdom (“Eweida”), a chamber of the European Court 
upheld state action based on the U.K.’s highly secularized modern 
view of religious freedom.118  In a case involving age-old moral 
beliefs about traditional marriage, two of the applicants were 
Christian employees who opposed same-sex partnerships on 
religious grounds, and whose consciences prevented them from 
                                                            
112 See generally Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001). 
113 Id. at 450.  
114 Id. at 463 (finding the hijab to be “imposed on women” by the 
Quran and finding it “difficult to reconcile” its wearing with the “tolerance, 
respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination” required in 
school).   
115 Id. 
116 Evans, supra note 90, at 331. 
117 See Berg, supra note 27, at 35 (“[N]ations that rest religious 
freedom on a highly secular rationale have been unsympathetic to the basic 
claims of citizens to manifest their belief in state schools in a non-coercive 
manner.”). 
118 Eweida & Others v. The United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2013). 
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taking official actions that furthered such relationships.  The first 
applicant—a Christian counselor at a privately owned relationship 
counseling group—was dismissed for “gross misconduct” under the 
company’s “equal opportunity” policy because he had referred same-
sex relationship cases to his co-worker counselors.119  Similarly, the 
second applicant had worked for the U.K. government as a marriage 
registrar.120  After a policy change required her to register same-sex 
civil partnerships, she made informal arrangements with co-workers 
to do those registrations for her.121  When two colleagues 
complained, her supervisors ordered her to perform the 
registrations.122  Both of these employees’ attempts to accommodate 
their beliefs on the job led to their dismissal from employment.123   
 
In its decision, the European Court cited the usual margin of 
appreciation rationale and sided with the U.K. in both cases, finding 
no consensus in Europe regarding the proper balance between 
conscience and accommodations regarding same-sex relationships.124  
The Court found that the state could place greater value in the secular 
“good” of affirming sexual orientation diversity rather than the 
religious “good” of following one’s conscience.125  This once again 
demonstrates that secular values inevitably will marginalize religious 
ones, “relegating diverse ways of life to an ever-shrinking private 
realm.”126  The illusion of neutrality is again dispelled. 
 
In Part V, this Article argues that some European Court cases 
promote a pluralistic neutrality that the U.S. Supreme Court should 
emulate.  Those cases will focus on the state’s right to acknowledge 
the value of religion in public life.  In contrast, the cases discussed in 
this Part have involved direct state suppression of individual liberties.  
                                                            
119 Id. paras. 31-37. 
120 Id. para. 25. 
121 Id. para. 26. 
122 Id.  
123 Id. paras. 27-28, 37.  
124 See Eweida & Others v. The United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2013). The Court did note, however, that “differences in treatment based on 
sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification.” 
Id. para. 105.   
125 Id. 
126 Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 576-77. 
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In each case, secularized nations denied the rights of citizens 
attempting to exercise their beliefs peacefully in public.  Nor did the 
European Court—the frustrated referee of these values—protect 
those citizens from the arm of the secular state;127 it instead affirmed 
secular goods over religious ones.  These European decisions provide 
an opportunity for the U.S. Supreme Court to avoid the natural result 
of accepting an intolerant secularism, as discussed in the next 
section.     
C. Secularism Lessons for the U.S. Supreme Court 
 What can the U.S. Supreme Court learn from the four 
negative European Court cases discussed in the prior section?  First, 
it should recognize that embracing the French-style “neutrality” 
inevitably would lead to the suppression of religious expression in 
the United States.  Second, the Supreme Court should realize that its 
jurisprudence interpreting the Religion Clauses has been heading in 
the same direction as Europe by embracing values that will lead to an 
intolerant secularism in America, if it does not alter that path.  
Finally, the Court should find that there is another way—a pluralistic 
neutrality principle—that can accommodate and affirm the good in 
religion while still respecting the rights and freedoms of people of all 
faiths, or no faith at all. 
 
 With regard to strict neutrality, the Supreme Court should 
take heed of the natural path of intolerant secularism discussed in 
Part III.  As seen in the above European cases, that progression is 
especially true in a nation like France, where the strict separation of 
church and state is part of the fabric of that nation’s structure.  
France’s trajectory demonstrates that a truly secular state must 
sanitize the public space of religious activity; yet, as France is 
experiencing, that practice itself harms society because it is 
“profoundly disturbing” to the human condition to shut out 
“religiously grounded beliefs . . . in the public debate over the 
                                                            
127 See Petty, supra note 25, at 824 (noting the European Court is “more 
concerned with the role of the state in religious affairs than with the rights of 
individuals,” and it views religion as a private rather than public way of life). 
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issues,”128 especially in light of the tradition of Western Civilization.  
Further, the Supreme Court should recognize that the French way is 
not the American way.  The secular “model of the relationship 
between church and state” that was “spread across Europe by the 
armies of Napoleon, and reflected in the Constitution of France . . . is 
not, and never was, the model adopted by America.”129  Indeed, that 
model cannot succeed easily in the United States, where society 
traditionally has been much less secular than in France.130  
 
Second, the Supreme Court should see that the negative 
European case examples above are only a step away from being 
decided similarly under the Supreme Court’s own religion 
jurisprudence, which at times elevates secular values to the exclusion 
of religious liberty.  This is partly due to the Court’s strict-neutrality 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence; however, it also relates to Free 
Exercise Clause cases after the Court’s controversial decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith.131  In particular, Free Exercise Clause 
analysis now resembles the European Court’s Article 9 ECHR 
process by merely requiring that the state possess a rational reason 
for regulating neutral activity that impacts religion.132  Thus, as in 
Europe, if the state provides a neutral justification for a rule—such as 
protecting public health, safety, or morals—and applies that rule in a 
generally applicable way, without targeting religion, then the U.S. 
Supreme Court is likely to uphold that law regardless of its impact on 
religion.   
 
Indeed, the four negative European Court cases discussed 
above are not far-removed from those already decided under the U.S. 
                                                            
128 Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 586. 
129 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 886 (2005) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Prélota, supra note 31, at 787 (“The aim of 
separation in France is to protect the State—and the individuals—from religions; 
the aim of separation in America is to protect freedom of religions through a 
strict equality.”). 
130 See Smith, supra note 14, at 169-78 (disputing that the U.S. became 
more secularized among common people in the 20th Century, and suggesting this 
perception is due to the secularization of some of the elite class). 
131 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990); see Kolenc, supra 
note 50, at 840-42 (discussing the controversy surrounding Smith). 
132 Id. 
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Constitution.  While the United States has not banned the wearing of 
a burqa in public, the U.S. military may ban religious garb while in 
uniform to enhance standardization.133  While Jewish groups have 
not been prevented from slaughtering meat, U.S. states may ban 
peyote to further their war on drugs, even though peyote is a major 
part of sacred Native American sacraments.134  While Muslim 
teachers may wear a hijab in class, school districts may force 
Christian teachers to keep their Bibles out of sight for fear of state 
endorsement of religion.135  And, in the name of toleration, the state 
may penalize public servants and private businesspersons with 
religious principles when their moral consciences prevent them from 
supporting same-sex marriage ceremonies.136 
 
The Supreme Court must come to see that the chaotic path its 
religion jurisprudence has taken, especially with regard to the 
Establishment Clause, is leading to the embrace of strict neutrality as 
a working principle, especially in the lower courts.137  Justice Scalia 
warned of this danger in his dissent in Locke v. Davey, where he 
connected the trajectory of France with the Supreme Court’s own 
                                                            
133 See Goldman v. Weinberger, 473 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting claim 
of an Air Force officer wishing to wear a Jewish yarmulke while in uniform; the 
Department of Defense later permitted this accommodation via regulation). 
134 See generally Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (using rational basis review in 
Free Exercise claims).  
135 See Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505, 1518 (D. Colo. 1989). 
136 See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2015) (affirming cease and desist order and monetary penalties against Colorado 
bakery that refused to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex marriage), cert. 
granted, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Com’n, 137 U.S. 2290 (Jun. 
26, 2017); see also Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (E.D. Ky. 2015) 
(granting injunction against public official who refused to issue marriage 
licenses due to religious objections; clerk jailed for contempt of court during 
process). 
137 See Dillon Elementary Sch. Dist. 10, No. 04-35088, 2005 WL 
2271720, at *647 (9th Cir. 2005) (banning individual from giving secular 
message at school function because of known affiliation with Christianity); 
Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach Cty., 387 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(upholding school’s removal of religious symbols in student mural); Fleming v. 
Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002) (upholding school 
ban on religious text or symbols on painted tiles hung within Columbine High 
School to commemorate shooting victims). 
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jurisprudence that allowed unequal treatment toward religion: 
 
[R]ecall that France has proposed 
banning religious attire from schools, 
invoking interests in secularism no 
less benign than those the Court 
embraces today. . . .  When the 
public’s freedom of conscience is 
invoked to justify denial of equal 
treatment, benevolent motives shade 
into indifference and ultimately into 
repression. Having accepted the 
justification in this case, the Court is 
less well equipped to fend it off in the 
future.138 
 
 Finally, the Supreme Court should look for a new direction to 
avoid the victory of intolerant secularism.  To accomplish this, 
however, it must re-evaluate its religion cases—especially with 
regard to the Establishment Clause—and recognize that the banner of 
strict neutrality has backfired.  There must be another way: perhaps a 
Europe-inspired path based on a more pluralistic type of neutrality.  
That is the focus of the remainder of this Article. 
V. POSITIVE LESSONS FROM EUROPE: THE CASE FOR PLURALISTIC 
NEUTRALITY 
Part IV discussed why the European Court of Human Rights 
(“European Court”) is not always effective in protecting religious 
liberty, especially when secular and religious values clash.  When the 
European Court has succeeded in protecting religion, however, the 
key has been its appreciation for “normative religious pluralism”—a 
recognition that religious diversity can be “a positive force in social 
life,” which can give “moral and spiritual depth to civic 
discourse.”139  A similar respect for pluralism can help the U.S. 
                                                            
138 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 734 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(protesting the Court’s decision upholding a program in Washington State that 
excluded only theology degrees from generally available scholarship funding). 
139 Lovin, supra note 72, at 91. 
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Supreme Court moderate its view of the Religion Clauses to avoid 
intolerant secularism and promote free exercise of religion. 
 
In Part V, this Article first contends that religious pluralism 
can serve as a unifying constitutional principle to protect religious 
freedom in both the European and American systems.  It then 
marshals cases from the European Court to illustrate how progressive 
modern societies can respect the diversity of faith among their people 
while not excluding religion from the public square.  It does this by 
comparing these European cases with the approach adopted by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in its religion jurisprudence, especially in the 
areas of public aid to religion and public acknowledgment of 
religion, including the topics of religious symbols, prayer, and 
education.  Although much more can and should be said on these 
topics as scholarly debate continues in the future, this Part offers 
some initial insights on these European lessons.  
A. Pluralism as a Unifying Constitutional Principle 
The European Court “repeatedly speaks of pluralism as the 
sine qua non of a democratic order, the full and proper expression of 
liberal freedom.”140  This is consistent with the work of those 
scholars who have argued that the ideal of religious pluralism can 
serve as a future model to protect religious freedom around the 
globe.141  Positive cases from the European Court show how a robust 
human rights system based on pluralism can succeed in progressive 
                                                            
140 Calo, supra note 28, at 261-62. 
141 For instance, Professor Peter Danchin has argued that “value 
pluralism” could be a model used in international law to protect religious 
freedom through “a plurality of collective subjects asserting claims of right.” 
Danchin, supra note 35, at 15. He makes the case that governments around the 
world should use “public measures to promote or protect the religious or cultural 
beliefs and identities of specific majority and minority groups,” resulting in the 
state providing “the same sort of rights to minorities that are taken for granted 
by the majority.” Id. 
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societies—even in nations that join church with state.142  Therefore, 
the U.S. Supreme Court should look to Europe for inspiration to 
reform its approach to the Religion Clauses: that is, to develop a 
better, more pluralistic neutrality principle. 
 
Over the past sixty years, the European Court has created its 
own version of the neutrality principle as it has “evolved”143 the 
rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.  While the U.S. Supreme Court’s religion 
cases may have influenced Europe on this front—after all, the text of 
the ECHR contains no semblance of an establishment clause—the 
European Court’s neutrality principle developed along much more 
moderate lines than those embraced by the Supreme Court.144  This 
is mostly because the European Court views pluralism as the 
“cornerstone of a human rights regime”—a value that fosters “liberal 
goods such as respect for diversity and toleration,” and “nourishes 
the health of democratic life.”145  But why should Europe’s view of 
pluralism be stronger than in America?   
 
Even more so than Europe, the United States historically has 
been at the forefront of protecting religious liberty.  The First 
Amendment made the free exercise of religion the nation’s first 
                                                            
142 See Curvino, supra note 79, at 512-13 (arguing that “a movement 
toward the establishment of one religion does not necessarily infringe upon the 
religious freedom of another,” and citing Spain to demonstrate how state 
“cooperation with religious denominations is a good thing because it helps them 
use their religious freedom more effectively”). 
143 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Conor O’Mahony, Evolutive 
Interpretation of Rights Provisions: A Comparison of the European Court of 
Human Rights and the U.S. Supreme Court, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 309, 
315-16 (2013) (“[I]n spite of its acceptance on a judicial level, evolutive 
interpretation of the ECHR remains susceptible to many of the same academic 
criticisms that have been leveled at its use in relation to the U.S. Constitution.”). 
144 It is unlikely the European Court will ever assimilate a French-style 
secularism into its more moderate neutrality principle because France’s version 
of secularism is “less appealing to—indeed, is opposed by—nations that have an 
interest in preserving a national identity steeped in religious historical tradition.” 
Maret, supra note 82, at 608-09. 
145 Calo, supra note 28, at 263 (Religious pluralism “is not one 
democratic virtue among many. It is the cornerstone of a human rights regime 
and the norm by which other norms are to be assessed.”). 
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“protected class” from government discrimination.  Moreover, from 
the beginning, the First Amendment viewed religion as something 
special—specifically protecting it, while rejecting a proposed 
broader protection for all rights of conscience.146  Europe, on the 
other hand, offered the ECHR’s protections to both religious and 
non-religious practices of conscience.147  Even prior to passage of the 
Bill of Rights, the U.S. Constitution went out of its way to protect 
freedom of religion by stating that “no religious test shall ever be 
required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the 
United States.”148  
 
Nor is pluralism a new concept in the United States, which, at 
the time of the ratification of the Constitution, “had already 
experienced 150 years of a higher degree of religious diversity than 
had existed anywhere else in the world.”149  Protestants of all 
varieties, Catholics, Jews, and others lived side-by-side, fighting for 
common causes.  The Constitution’s “religious-test” prohibition was 
itself a victory for religious diversity because it ensured “a much 
richer and deeper pluralism” by “welcoming into the cacophony of 
political and civil life the religious voices” of many faiths, “alongside 
their Protestant brothers and sisters.”150  The Framers lived in a 
world that recognized religious diversity and that understood the 
need to keep the state neutral toward religion’s many represented 
                                                            
146 The Framers excluded conscience rights from protection under the 
Religion Clauses by rejecting a version of the First Amendment that would have 
protected more than just religion. See Kolenc, supra note 20, at 406-07. 
147 See Statute of the Council of Europe pmbl., May 5, 1949, 87 
U.N.T.S. 103, 104 (1951); MACKENZIE, supra note 12, at 329-30 (outlining the 
“[f]reedom of thought, conscience and religion”); see also ECHR, supra note 7, 
art 10. The ECHR also expressly protects against violations of related rights, 
such as freedom of expression, freedom from discrimination, and freedom of 
parents to educate their children on religious matters. See ECHR, supra note 7, 
arts. 14, 26, and Protocol 1, art. 2. 
148 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3. 
149 McConnell, supra note 21, at 1421. 
150 Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 571-72. 
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views,151 while at the same time accepting the importance of religion 
(in general) in public life—a pluralistic neutrality.   
 
In short, history makes clear that the concept of pluralistic 
neutrality is not a novel theory.  It undoubtedly shares common 
ground with the position of “accommodationists,”152 “non-
preferentialists,”153 and those who advocate for a “legal coercion 
test.”154  All three of those theories stem from a similar desire to 
define neutrality so that it ensures the “impartiality of the state with 
regard to all religions, but not a distancing from religion [in 
general].”155  Further, those theories all reject the Supreme Court’s 
on-again, off-again relationship with strict neutrality, recognizing 
that a state that accepts religion in the public sphere will further 
religious freedom by embracing a “constructive process of exchange 
and critique within faiths, between faiths, and between religious and 
                                                            
151 In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878), the Court 
first invoked Thomas Jefferson’s language about “a wall of separation between 
church and state,” from his 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists. Yet, even in that 
context, the Court clearly did not intend that as an embrace of strict neutrality 
because the Court also accepted James Madison’s monotheistic use of the term 
“religion,” which he described as “the duty we owe the Creator.” Id. at 163 
(quoting Madison’s “Memorial and Remonstrance,” Semple’s Virginia Baptists, 
Appendix). 
152 Danchin, supra note 35, at 34 (arguing that U.S. “value pluralism” 
uses a Judeo-Christian “accommodationist approach that takes into account not 
only the role of religion generally, but also the role of the religion of the 
majority in particular, in the public life and history of the nation and its 
institutions of government”). 
153 See generally Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: 
A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 878 (1987) 
(rejecting non-preferentialism as inconsistent with the Founders’ debates about 
the Religion Clauses, finding that “the Framers . . . believed that nonpreferential 
aid would establish religion”).  
154 Those who advocate for such a test view the Establishment Clause 
as primarily directed toward prohibiting the “coercion of religious orthodoxy 
and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.” Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting L. 
LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 4 (1986)). This is similar to the “actual 
coercion” test advocated by Justice Scalia in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 577 
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
155 Palomino, supra note 33, at 678-79. 
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non-religious traditions of thought.”156   
 
Whereas intolerant secularism takes sides against religion, 
requiring “the religious person to leave her deepest self and most 
profound commitments at home as a price for admission to the public 
square,”157 pluralistic neutrality is inclusive.  A truly pluralistic 
approach to neutrality welcomes both secular and religious ideas.  It 
works not “to associate religious pluralism in human rights with a 
creeping theocratic impulse;” but, instead, to draw “religion into a 
conversation about the moral structure of modernity.”158  In a 
democratic and pluralistic society, where the government “mirror[s] 
the culture as a whole,” natural notions of neutrality should “lead to a 
broadly inclusive public sphere, in which the public is presented a 
wide variety of perspectives, religious ones included.”159  Such a 
society also makes accommodations for religion because “[w]ithout 
respect for the differences of religious communities from general 
secular behavior, pluralism would be an empty word.”160  
 
As the rest of this Article illustrates, pluralistic neutrality is a 
theory that the European Court has put into practice in several key 
cases.  And while that Court has sometimes failed to live up to its 
pluralistic rhetoric,161 a survey of some positive European Court 
cases can provide important lessons for the U.S. Supreme Court.  
More specifically, those cases can point the way to a better path—
                                                            
156 Calo, supra note 28, at 277. 
157 Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 586. 
158 Calo, supra note 28, at 278 (noting also that “no single tradition, 
religious or secular, is to monopolize political discourse over the meaning of 
shared public goods”); see also Scaperlanda, supra note 29, at 587 (“The middle 
way between theocracy and secularocracy consists of a secular state influenced 
profoundly and organically by the deeply pluralistic culture that surrounds it and 
supports it.”). 
159 McConnell, supra note 53, at 193; see also Scaperlanda, supra note 
29, at 586 (“True, thick, robust, and unafraid pluralism welcomes the whole of 
every person into the public debate.”). 
160 Robbers, supra note 111, at 281, 306. 
161 Evans, supra note 90, at 342 (The Court still has “substantial work” 
to do “in creating a robust concept of pluralism and applying it in a meaningful 
way. . . . The Court is too ready to move to the limits of pluralism without 
serious engagement with what a pluralistic society would look like . . . .”).  
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one that interprets the Constitution’s Religion Clauses in a more 
moderate fashion, with a neutrality principle that both enhances 
religious pluralism and affirms religion in general.   
B. Pluralistic Neutrality and Public Aid to Religion  
Regarding the issue of public funding for religious 
organizations, the U.S. Supreme Court already has begun to learn 
from Europe, within the undeniable strictures that the Establishment 
Clause places on the use of taxpayer dollars.  This is an area where 
the modern Supreme Court has rejected an overly strict version of the 
neutrality principle, and recently has settled on a more pluralistic, 
commonsense approach that allows for public funding of religion as 
part of neutral, generally available programs.  Yet, despite positive 
developments in this area over the past three decades, there is room 
in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence for further growth. 
1. Undeniable Limits on Lessons from Europe 
The European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) contains no establishment clause; 
moreover, several of its member-states continue to fund official state 
religions.  In contrast, the Framers undoubtedly intended the 
Establishment Clause to place limits on the funding of religion in the 
United States.  As Justice Scalia explained: “[B]y 1790 the term 
‘establishment’ had acquired an additional meaning—‘financial 
support of religion generally, by public taxation’—that reflected the 
development of ‘general or multiple’ establishments, not limited to a 
single church.”162  Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has reached broad 
consensus on the idea that the Establishment Clause (at least) forbids 
the state from expending “significant amounts of tax money to serve 
                                                            
162 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640-42 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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the cause of one religious faith.”163  Due to this crucial difference 
between the two systems, there always will be a constitutional ceiling 
on how far the Supreme Court can go in allowing European-style, 
direct funding of religion. 
 
For instance, Ásatrúarfélagid v. Iceland (“Iceland”) involved 
the National Church of Iceland, which the state supported through a 
tax system that distributed “parish tithes” to one’s home parish and 
provided the national church additional funds for its duties, salaries, 
and obligations required under law.164  A minority religious group, 
which honored the ancient Norse gods, filed a complaint seeking a 
comparable additional tithe for its own support.165  Notably, the 
group did not challenge the legitimacy of the parish tax system, 
instead agreeing that “[b]y providing registered religious associations 
with parish charges, based on income tax of individual citizens, the 
State of Iceland is actively protecting the members’ rights to practise 
their religion.”166  The European Court ultimately found the group’s 
application to be inadmissible as “manifestly ill-founded” because 
Iceland had provided a reasonable explanation for its need to pay 
extra tithe money to its national church.167  A similar result occurred 
in a more recent German tax case.168 
 
The Iceland case offers a key lesson for the U.S. Supreme 
Court: the Norse religious group—though it was a minority religion 
                                                            
163 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660, 664 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995) (“The 
apprehensions of our predecessors involved the levying of taxes upon the public 
for the sole and exclusive purpose of establishing and supporting specific 
sects.”). 
164 Ásatrúarfélagid v. Iceland, App. No. 22897/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2012). 
165 See id.  
166 Id. para. 130.  
167 See generally id. 
168 See Klein & Others v. Germany, App. Nos. 10138/11, 16687/11, 
25359/11, & 28919/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017) (finding no violation of Art. 9 by 
law that permitted state involvement in levying special fees/taxes on church 
members). 
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in a nation with an established church—recognized that Iceland’s tax 
system benefited society by enhancing religious pluralism.  Despite 
this insight, however, there can be no doubt that the Establishment 
Clause would act as a ceiling on this type of tax system in the United 
States, even under pluralistic neutrality.  Iceland directly supports a 
specific sect with taxpayer funds—a practice that strikes at the core 
of the Establishment Clause.  Some lessons from Europe rightly will 
dead-end at un-crossable barriers in the U.S. system.   
2. Public Aid and the Supreme Court’s European Excursion 
 Over the past thirty years, the U.S. Supreme Court’s religion 
cases have inched ever closer to the European Court’s model of 
accepting public aid for religion.  From the beginning of the Supreme 
Court’s modern religion jurisprudence, the Justices have struggled to 
figure out how far the Establishment Clause should go in banning 
public funding of religion.  Even in Everson, the Court approved a 
program that allowed New Jersey to expend tax dollars on bus fares 
for Catholic students.169  While acknowledging that the tax funds 
would encourage some families to send their children to religious 
schools, Justice Hugo Black’s majority opinion explained in dicta 
why the state could use tax dollars to benefit religion in many 
common funding programs: 
 
Similarly, parents might be 
reluctant to permit their children to 
attend schools which the state had cut 
off from such general government 
services as ordinary police and fire 
protection, connections for sewage 
disposal, public highways and 
sidewalks.  Of course, cutting off 
church schools from these services, so 
separate and so indisputably marked 
off from the religious function, would 
make it far more difficult for the 
schools to operate.  But . . . the First 
                                                            
169 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947). 
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Amendment . . . requires the state to 
be a neutral in its relations with 
groups of religious believers and non-
believers; it does not require the state 
to be their adversary.170 
 
The Court’s dicta in Everson recognized, at least in theory, a 
less-strict neutrality principle that could tolerate spending tax funds 
on religion through generally available, neutral government 
programs.  In the following decades, however, the Court struck down 
numerous such aid programs, most notably in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
where the Court erected its controversial three-pronged test to 
determine when state action violates the Establishment Clause.171  
During this period, the Court struck down several publicly funded 
programs172 while upholding a few expenditures that conferred 
merely “‘indirect,’ ‘remote,’ or ‘incidental’ benefit[s] upon religious 
institutions,”173 or that posed little threat to the principles of the 
                                                            
170 Id. 
171 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (striking 
programs funding teachers for religious schools). The Lemon test requires laws 
to meet three requirements: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.’” Id. at 612 (citations omitted). 
172 See Sch. Dist. of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 393 
(1985) (striking community education program), overruled by Agostini v. 
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (striking 
funds for guidance counseling, speech, and hearing services); Comm. for Pub. 
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973) (striking a 
program for maintenance and repair costs); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & 
Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (striking funds for teacher-prepared 
tests).  
173 Sch. Dist. of City of Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 393. 
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Establishment Clause.174    
 
Starting in the 1980s, however, personnel changes on the 
Supreme Court led to the creation of a new conservative majority, 
which began to embrace a more European-style pluralistic neutrality 
principle around public aid to religion.  The Court began upholding 
far-reaching benefit programs that resulted in generally available tax 
funds flowing to religious institutions,175 culminating in the approval 
of a school voucher program in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.176  With 
Justice Neil Gorsuch filling the seat of the late Justice Antonin 
Scalia, this flexible approach has continued, as shown by the Court’s 
most recent decision in this area.   
 
In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer 
(“Comer”), the Court— in a solid 7 to 2 decision— reaffirmed that 
the Constitution does not prevent states from giving direct tax funds 
                                                            
174 See Walz v. Tax Com. of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) 
(upholding religious property tax exemption, noting room in the Religion 
Clauses “for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will 
permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without 
interference”). This “benevolent neutrality” was referenced by the Court only 
three other times, most recently in 1994, and on two of those occasions, the 
Court cited it only while striking down a tax program that aided religion. Bd. of 
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994) 
(striking city accommodation for Jewish group); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 327 
(1987) (upholding religious exemption to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); 
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. at 792 (striking financial 
aid grants to religion). 
175 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding program 
that allowed religious schools to borrow “secular” educational materials and 
equipment); see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819 (1995) (upholding tax funds to print student group’s religious 
magazine); see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) 
(upholding tax funds for sign-language interpreter at religious school); see also 
Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding 
blind student’s subsidy at religious school); see also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 
388 (1983) (upholding state tax deductions for religious educational expenses). 
176 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding 
Cleveland’s school voucher program for needy students, even though the tax 
funds were used overwhelmingly by parents for tuition at private religious 
schools).  
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to churches as part of a neutral, generally available public benefit.177  
Indeed, the Court accepted as settled law under the Establishment 
Clause that Missouri could provide direct public funding to a 
religious preschool to build a playground for children, even though a 
church fully owned that school.178  More significantly, the Comer 
Court took a revolutionary step forward by concluding that the Free 
Exercise Clause required the state to provide those direct funds to 
religion, as long as the church qualified for the money under neutral 
criteria set forth under the program.179  
 
As the Supreme Court has moved toward a more pluralistic 
neutrality in this area, the example of Europe has not been lost on 
individual Supreme Court Justices.  Some Justices have noted the 
success of government aid to religion in such diverse European 
church-state models as the United Kingdom and France.  Indeed, this 
is an area where Justices Breyer and Scalia— great minds on both 
ends of the ideological spectrum—have debated and found common 
ground.  Breyer, whose dissent in Zelman decried the constitutional 
validity of school vouchers, indicated during one such debate that he 
had become “uncertain” about the validity of his Zelman dissent 
because “in France they subsidize a religious school and it isn’t the 
end of the earth.  And the same thing is true in Britain, [and] other 
countries.”180  Remarkably, Justice Scalia—who vehemently 
opposed the practice of U.S. judges consulting foreign case law—
agreed that it would be appropriate to look to Europe “to show that if 
                                                            
177 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 
2012 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part). 
178 None of the seven Justices who voted in favor of the church 
indicated any concern with the constitutionality of providing the public funds 
under the Establishment Clause.  Instead, the Court noted: “The parties agree 
that the Establishment Clause of that Amendment does not prevent Missouri 
from including Trinity Lutheran in the Scrap Tire Program.” Id. at 2019. 
179 See id. at 2021 (finding that “disqualifying [a church] from a public 
benefit solely because of their religious character . . . imposes a penalty on the 
free exercise of religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny”). 
180 Full Written Transcript of Scalia-Breyer Debate on Foreign Law, 
FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (Jan. 13, 2005), 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/ 1352357/posts (referencing Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717-29 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).  
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the Court adopts this particular view, the sky will not fall.  You 
know, if we got much more latitudinarian about our approach to the 
Establishment Clause, things won’t be so bad. . . . It’s useful for 
that.”181 
 
In fact, the Supreme Court still has room for growth in 
moving closer to Europe without violating the strictures of the 
Establishment Clause, as Justice Gorsuch intimated in his concurring 
opinion in Comer.  He took issue with the Court’s apparent openness 
to “the possibility [that] a useful distinction might be drawn between 
laws that discriminate on the basis of religious status and religious 
use.”182  Gorsuch argued that the Establishment Clause would 
allow—and that the Free Exercise Clause would require—the state to 
distribute neutral funds to a church even if the money would be spent 
furthering a religious mission.183  He asked:  
 
Is it a religious group that built the 
playground?  Or did a group build the 
playground so it might be used to 
advance a religious mission?  The 
distinction blurs . . . .  Neither do I see 
why the First Amendment’s Free 
Exercise Clause should care.  After 
all, that Clause guarantees the free 
exercise of religion, not just the right 
to inward belief (or status).184  
 
This position would break the prevailing notion in some 
circles that the Establishment Clause requires the state to ensure that 
religious groups spend public funds solely on secular uses.  Gorsuch 
would not care how the church spent the money; he would focus 
only on whether the state distributed generally available funds using 
neutral criteria. 
 
                                                            
181 Id.  
182 Comer, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part). 
183 Id. at 2025-26.  
184 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 
2012, 2025-26 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part). 
51
94 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. XXX] 1N 
 
Justice Gorsuch is correct.  If a neutral state program neither 
establishes a state religion nor takes a step in that direction, why 
should the Establishment Clause care if some religious causes are the 
collateral beneficiaries of those generally available funds?  The 
model of Europe demonstrates that, under the right conditions, 
individual religious liberty can thrive even where the state funds an 
established religion.  Dispensing generally available, neutral funds to 
a church would neither violate the Establishment Clause nor threaten 
individual religious freedom, regardless of how the church spends 
that money.  To the contrary, the fair distribution of those funds 
would further the cause of diversity by not punishing groups simply 
because of their religious affiliation.  In other words, it would affirm 
the principle of pluralistic neutrality. 
C. Pluralistic Neutrality and Public Displays of Religious 
Symbols 
 Unlike with public aid to religion, the Supreme Court has not 
found consensus yet on the proper level of neutrality to apply where 
the state acknowledges religion with a symbolic display.  This is an 
area of fertile ground, where the European Court’s approach can be 
instructive.  First, this section briefly addresses the status of religious 
displays under case law in the United States.  It then engages in a full 
discussion of the European Court’s Lautsi v. Italy case, which 
illustrates on several levels the problems and potential solutions for 
dealing with religious symbolism under a pluralistic neutrality 
approach. 
1. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Approach 185 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s display cases, religious 
symbols that retain their sacred meaning are being systematically 
                                                            
185 A full treatment of this complex topic cannot hope to be 
accomplished in this short space. Thus, this section seeks only to sum up the 
current U.S. situation and focus on points of comparison for useful lessons from 
Europe. 
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purged from the U.S. public square, especially by the lower courts.186  
In contrast, the European Court recognizes—just barely, 
perhaps187—what U.S. courts seem to have forgotten: that 
“inculturation”188 of religion has enriched society throughout history, 
and that removing religion from culture does violence to society’s 
identity.189  Recently, with a more conservative majority on the 
Supreme Court, some scholars believe the Court is now “moving in 
similar directions” as the European Court in this area.190  The 
Supreme Court, however, is yet to embrace a truly pluralistic 
neutrality approach on this issue. 
 
The first two prongs of the Supreme Court’s controversial 
Lemon test are largely responsible for the removal of religious 
symbols from publicly owned lands and buildings in the United 
                                                            
186 See Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, Utah High. Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 565 U.S. 994 (2011) 
(removing memorial cross for troopers); Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d 
1 (2d Cir. 2006) (removing crèche); Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach Cty., 
387 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2004) (removing symbols in mural); Fleming v. 
Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002) (removing symbols 
on school tiles); Harris v. City of Zion, Lake Cty., Ill., 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 
1991) (removing city emblems); see generally Amanda Reid, Private Memorials 
on Public Space: Roadside Crosses at the Intersection of the Free Speech 
Clause and the Establishment Clause, 92 NEB. L. REV. 124 (2013) (discussing 
state of case law). 
187 Without doubt, the European Court has struggled to maintain 
Europe’s connection to its past and to prevent secularism from negating its 
“inherited cultural and moral identity,” which causes it to “become a civilization 
‘that does not understand itself.’” Calo, supra note 28, at 269 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
188 Gedicks & Annicchino, supra note 84, at 86-87. 
189 See Danchin, supra note 35, at 13 (noting that “the culture and 
historical traditions of national groups have been shaped, to varying degrees, by 
particular religious traditions”). 
190 Katie A. Croghan, Lautsi and Salazar: Are Religious Symbols 
Legitimate in the Public Square?, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 507, 510 (2013); 
see also Witte & Arold, supra note 12, at 52 (listing six teachings that they 
believe the U.S. Supreme Court holds in common with the European Court in 
this area); see generally Marie Elizabeth Roper, Secular Crosses and the 
Neutrality of Secularism: Reflections on the Demands of Neutrality and its 
Consequences for Religious Symbols—The European Court of Human Rights in 
Lautsi and the U.S. Supreme Court in Salazar, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 841 
(2012) (comparing the Lautsi case with the Salazar case).   
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States.191  The first prong of that test requires that a state has “secular 
legislative purpose” when displaying a religious symbol on 
government property.192  Using this prong, the Court has found 
Establishment Clause violations when officials sought to generally 
recognize or promote religion through a symbolic display, such as a 
monument to the Ten Commandments.193   
 
The test’s second prong requires that a display’s “principal or 
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion.”194  This prong does not take into account a religious 
display that may actually have a secular purpose.  Under this version 
of neutrality, the Court will still strike down a display if it has the 
primary effect of advancing religion, such as displaying a crèche that 
recognizes “Christmas in a way that has the effect of endorsing a 
patently Christian message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus 
Christ.”195  Due to this prong, it is no longer possible for the state 
truly to acknowledge the core of any religious event, no matter how 
valuable the community finds it, and no matter how many centuries 
the state has acknowledged it ceremonially.196   
 
Thus, under the modern Supreme Court’s display cases, the 
only permissible way for the state to acknowledge a religious event 
or doctrine is to sanitize its religious aspects, morphing it into a 
primarily secular thing—such as making Christmas mostly about 
                                                            
191 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
192 Id. at 612. 
193 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (removing 
10 Commandments from courthouse due to purpose prong); Stone v. Graham, 
449 U.S. 39, 40–41 (1980) (removing display from public schools despite the 
legislature’s belief there could be a “secular application” of the 10 
Commandments due to its place “as the fundamental legal code of Western 
Civilization and the Common Law” of the U.S.).  
194 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.  
195 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989). 
196 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1984) (The Supreme 
Court has recognized the “unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all 
three branches of government of the role of religion in American life from at 
least 1789. . . . Our history is replete with official references to the value and 
invocation of Divine guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the 
Founding Fathers.”). 
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trees, gifts, snowmen, and red-nosed reindeer.197  No doubt, under 
this test a religious display will survive judicial scrutiny, but only if it 
is stripped of its core religious meaning.  Far from pluralism, this 
type of jurisprudence only furthers the current trend toward “the 
violence of uniformity.”198  A far better approach would be to adopt 
Justice Scalia’s position that the mere “acknowledgement of the 
Creator” or “[i]nvocation of God” by the state “is not an 
establishment” of religion.199 
 
To a lesser degree than in the United States, the European 
Court has also struggled with the issue of symbolic religious 
displays.  The key case in this area is Lautsi & Others v. Italy, which 
journeyed through three distinct phases—the first in the Italian 
courts, the second in a lower Chamber of the European Court, and 
the third in that Court’s Grand Chamber.200  These phases illustrate 
the struggle over religious symbols and the distinct choices that 
courts face on this matter. 
2. The Lautsi Case in Italy: The De-Meaning of Religious Symbols 
The Lautsi case stemmed from an 1860 royal edict that 
predated the unification of Italy (but which was continued by 
governments throughout later stages of Italian history), requiring that 
the crucifix—a Christian (primarily Catholic) symbol that displays 
the body of Jesus Christ hanging on the cross—be hung in Italian 
                                                            
197 See generally id. (permitting the display of a crèche among secular 
symbols). 
198 Calo, supra note 28, at 277 (noting also the “impoverishment” of 
marginalizing “particularistic commitments”). 
199 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 899–900 (2005) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing also that his position would not marginalize non-
monotheistic religious adherents because they would still be “entirely protected 
by the Free Exercise Clause, and by those aspects of the Establishment Clause 
that do not relate to government acknowledgment of the Creator”). 
200 Phase I consisted of rulings by the Italian national courts. Phase II 
resulted in Lautsi & Others v. Italy, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. (“Lautsi I”), a 
decision by a chamber of the European Court. This chamber ruling was 
overturned by the Grand Chamber in Phase III in Lautsi & Others v. Italy, App. 
No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011) (“Lautsi II”).  
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state-run classrooms.201  In 2002, Soile Lautsi and her husband 
challenged the practice of displaying the crucifix, arguing that they 
intended to raise their two teenage boys in accordance with the 
principle of secularism, and that the presence of the crucifix in the 
boys’ state-run school was contrary to that practice.202   
 
Italy historically had set up Catholicism as the only religion 
of the state; however, a 1985 Concordat with the Vatican had 
changed that practice, essentially turning Italy into a pluralist secular 
state.203  According to the Italian courts, “the principle of secularism 
was derived from the [Italian] Constitution . . . [and] implied not that 
the State should be indifferent to religions but that it should 
guarantee the protection of the freedom of religion in a context of 
confessional and cultural pluralism.”204  After considering the case of 
the Lautsi family, Italy affirmed the right of the state to hang 
crucifixes in state-run classrooms.205  This decision was challenged 
by Ms. Lautsi at the European Court of Human Rights, in Lautsi I 
and II. 
 
Prior to Ms. Lautsi’s appeal to the European Court, the 
national courts gave the victory to the state by turning the crucifix 
into a symbol of Italian civilization.206  The highest administrative 
court reasoned that the crucifix “was compatible with the principle of 
secularism” because it: 
 
[S]ymbolised the religious origin of 
values (tolerance, mutual respect, 
valorisation of the person, affirmation 
of one's rights, consideration for one’s 
freedom, the autonomy of one’s moral 
conscience vis-à-vis authority, human 
                                                            
201 Lautsi & Others v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 
17 (2011). 
202 Id. paras. 10-12.  
203 Id. para. 22.  
204 Id. para. 23. 
205 Id.    
206 Id. para. 16.  
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solidarity and the refusal of any form 
of discrimination) which characterised 
Italian civilisation.  In that sense, 
when displayed in classrooms, the 
crucifix could fulfil—even in a 
“secular” perspective distinct from the 
religious perspective to which it 
specifically referred—a highly 
educational symbolic function.207 
 
Thus, to justify the crucifix, the courts “devalue[d] its 
religious significance and, indirectly, endorse[d] the principle that a 
symbol can be displayed in a public institution only if the symbol has 
no religious character.”208  They transformed a religious symbol into 
a secular civic symbol.   
 
This reasoning is similar to a strain of the Establishment 
Clause argument in the United States that would allow the state to 
promote only a hybrid kind of “civil religion”—a “thin, nationalistic 
deism believed necessary, and constitutionally permissible, for public 
ceremony and for the expression of patriotism,” which is “regarded 
by most Americans to be a . . . bastard relation.”209  While perhaps 
well-intentioned, this theory is counter-productive in a society that 
truly values pluralistic neutrality.  The “transformative” process of 
“desacralizing” religious symbols and “reconstructing” them so that 
they “belong[] to everybody”210 actually harms the cause of religious 
pluralism because it “dilute[s] the authentic testimony of religions 
and believers who are already estranged from Western culture.” 211 
                                                            
207 Id.  
208 Silvio Ferrari, State-Supported Display of Religious Symbols in the 
Public Space, 52 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 7, 16-17 (2013). 
209 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Why Are We Talking About Civil 
Religion Now: Comments on “Civil Religion in Italy: A ‘Mission Impossible’?” 
by Alessandro Ferrari, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 877, 879 (2010); see also 
Alessandro Ferrari, Civil Religion in Italy: A “Mission Impossible”?, 41 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 839, 839-40 (2010) (noting civil religion’s attempt to 
reconcile rules of democracy with “warm contributions of all religions to social 
cohesion”). 
210 Beaman, supra note 25, at 80. 
211 See Gedicks & Annicchino, supra note 84, at 139. 
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3. The Lautsi Case at the Lower Chamber: Intolerant Secularism at 
Work 
When the Lautsi case finally arrived at the European Court, 
one of its lower chambers considered whether the display of a 
crucifix in state-run classrooms violates the ECHR.212  The lower 
Chamber rejected Italy’s suggestion to consider the crucifix as a 
neutral and secular symbol in the classroom.  The Court agreed that 
“the symbol of the crucifix” has a number of meanings, but it 
concluded that “the religious meaning was predominant.”213  The 
Chamber viewed the crucifix as a “powerful external symbol” of 
Catholicism—much like the prohibited Islamic headscarf in the 
Swiss Dahlab case214—that may be “emotionally disturbing for 
pupils of non-Christian religions or those who professed no 
religion.”215  
 
In this light, the lower Chamber found a violation of both the 
right of education and the freedom of religion, because the judges 
could not see how displaying a religious symbol “could serve the 
educational pluralism which is essential for the preservation of 
‘democratic society’ within the Convention meaning of that term.”216  
The Chamber reasoned that “the compulsory display of a symbol of a 
particular faith in the exercise of public authority” violated the rights 
of parents and students and was “incompatible with the state’s duty 
to respect neutrality in the exercise of public authority, particularly in 
the field of education.”217   
                                                            
212 In addition to claiming a violation of freedom of religion (ECHR, 
Art. 9), Lautsi also raised her challenge to the crucifix under a principle of non-
discrimination (ECHR, Art. 14) and the right of parents to “ensure such 
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
convictions” (ECHR, Prot. 1, Art. 2). The chamber resolved the issue using the 
right to education and freedom of religion. Lautsi & Others v. Italy, 2009-II Eur. 
Ct. H.R. at para. 79. 
213 Id. para. 51. 
214 See supra notes 112-117 & accompanying text (discussing the 
Dahlab case). 
215 Lautsi & Others, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at paras. 54-55. 
216 Id. para. 56. 
217 Id. para. 57. 
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The Lautsi I ruling in the lower Chamber was a partial 
victory for intolerant secularism.  Moreover, the Chamber’s 
reasoning was compatible with the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach 
under the Establishment Clause,218 despite the lack of a similar 
clause in the ECHR.  Negative reaction to the Lautsi I ruling was 
immediate, especially by the “sizeable number of European countries 
and people that support displays of religious affiliation in public 
spaces” because they view their religious symbols “to be a part of 
their cultural heritage.”219  Nor were Europeans the only people who 
noted this relationship between the crucifix, history, and culture.220   
 
The lower Chamber’s decision was problematic on several 
fronts.  First, the judges did not appreciate the diversity of church-
state models in Europe, failing to distinguish the lighter Italian form 
of secularism from French laïcité.221  The Chamber’s position would 
have forced all European nations “to follow the French secular 
                                                            
218 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (permitting the 
Commandments on the lawn of the Texas State Capitol among 17 memorials 
and 21 historical markers); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) 
(permitting a crèche among secular symbols, including a Christmas tree and 
snowmen). 
219 William L. Saunders, Does Neutrality Equal Secularism? The 
European Court of Human Rights Decides Lautsi v. Italy, 12 ENGAGE: J. 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GRPS. 170, 173 (2011); see also Maret, supra note 82, 
at 606–07 (noting that Europe was historically “marked by a distinctly Christian 
identity . . . [that] ‘served as a medium of cultural cohesion for groups otherwise 
separated by language and ethnic traditions’”). 
220 Legislators in Québec, Canada, unanimously rejected the 
recommendations of a report to remove a crucifix in the “Blue Room” of the 
National Assembly. Then-premier Jean Charest explained: “The Church has 
played an important role in Québec’s history and the crucifix is the symbol of 
that history.” Beaman, supra note 25, at 73.  
221 Gedicks & Annicchino, supra note 84, at 98-99 (noting that Italian 
laicità “emerged in the wake of the 1984 Villa Madam Accords between Italy 
and the Holy See, which transformed Italy from a confessional to a secular state 
but expressly recognized Catholicism as part of Italy’s ‘historical heritage’”). 
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model, and suppress all signs of religious identity as non-neutral.”222  
This would not have been a victory for pluralism, but intolerant 
secularism.  Second, the lower Chamber “appeared to assert a 
preference for symbols segregated from their religious background 
over those symbols whose religious theme could not be so 
removed.”223  This policy would have exerted pressure on member-
states to drain religious meaning from their future symbols.  Finally, 
as the Grand Chamber would later recognize, the lower Chamber’s 
reasoning did not appreciate the distinction between active and 
passive religious symbols.224   
4. The Lautsi Case at the Grand Chamber: A Pluralistic Neutrality 
Approach 
After the outcry against the Lautsi I ruling, the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court took up the case and reversed.  
While some saw the reversal “as a capitulation of the European court 
to Christian European lobbies,”225 or as a blow to minority 
religions,226 it is better viewed as a victory against a form of 
secularism that cannot tolerate religious symbolism in public culture. 
 
In reversing, the Grand Chamber found “no European 
                                                            
222 Prélota, supra note 31, at 787. As the Grand Chamber found in 
Lautsi II, this would have been a problem in many member-states in the Council 
of Europe, seeing as some required such symbols in public schools—such as 
Italy, Austria, Poland, and parts of Germany and Switzerland—while others 
allowed the practice in their public schools, like Spain, Greece, Ireland, Malta, 
San Marino, and Romania). See Lautsi & Others v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 27 (2011). 
223 Croghan, supra note 193, at 524. 
224 See generally Rob Lamb, When Human Rights Have Gone Too Far: 
Religious Tradition and Equality in Lautsi v. Italy, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 751, 766-67 (2011) (criticizing the Lautsi I Court’s conclusions on the 
crucifix as a passive symbol of persecution and disrespect). 
225 Prélota, supra note 31, at 784. 
226 See Maret, supra note 82, at 610-11 (arguing that Lautsi II 
“perpetuate[s] the marginalization of minority religions in Italy” and “excludes 
individuals and groups whose historical, religious, or cultural traditions are 
different from those recognized by the State”); see also Romero, supra note 54, 
at 84–94 (criticizing Lautsi II for being untrue to the neutrality principle). 
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consensus on the question of the presence of religious symbols in 
State schools,” due to the diversity of church-state models present 
throughout Europe.227  The Grand Chamber acknowledged, however, 
that the ECHR required the European Court to “safeguard the 
possibility of pluralism in education” by requiring the state to convey 
information about religion in the school curriculum “in an objective, 
critical and pluralistic manner . . . free of any proselytism . . . [or] 
indoctrination that might be considered as not respecting parents’ 
religious and philosophical convictions.”228  The Grand Chamber 
also agreed with the lower Chamber that “the crucifix is above all a 
religious symbol,” noting that “whether the crucifix is charged with 
any other meaning beyond its religious symbolism is not decisive at 
this stage of the [C]ourt's reasoning.”229 
 
In light of the lack of European consensus and the Court’s 
need to give a wide margin of appreciation to member-state policies 
on matters involving religion, the Grand Chamber ruled in favor of 
Italy and the hanging of the crucifixes.  The Court found that the 
lower Chamber had not sufficiently weighed the State’s interest in 
the context of the religious culture of the State, where Catholicism 
had played a crucial historical role in binding together the unified 
nation of Italy—“a country without a common language and without 
a widespread culture capable of founding civic engagement.”230  
Recognizing the unique place of the crucifix in a historical Italian-
Catholic culture,231 the Grand Chamber concluded that the Italian 
display of crucifixes was not a violation of the ECHR, in light of the 
wide margin of appreciation due to the nation.  
 
The next section of this Article extracts from the Grand 
Chamber’s decision in Lautsi II three key considerations that can be 
transferred to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence to apply a more pluralistic neutrality principle in 
                                                            
227 Lautsi & Others v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 
70 (2011). 
228 Id. para. 62. 
229 Id. para. 66. 
230 Ferrari, supra note 209, at 841-42. 
231 Id. at 854-55 (noting the crucifix might act as a symbol of an 
“exclusive national ‘ethnos’ founded on its religion”). 
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religious display cases. 
5. Three Pluralistic Neutrality Considerations for the Supreme Court 
If the Supreme Court continues to insist on viewing religious 
display cases under the Establishment Clause,232 then the Grand 
Chamber’s analysis in Lautsi II can help the Supreme Court review 
those cases in a way that respects establishment limits while also 
taking into account a principle of pluralistic neutrality.  Three 
considerations of the Grand Chamber are of particular import: (1) 
whether the environment where the symbol is displayed respects 
individual religious liberties; (2) whether the symbol relates to the 
cultural identity of the community; and (3) whether the symbol is 
active or passive. 
 
First, the Grand Chamber looked to the environment in which 
the state displayed the symbol to determine whether it might offend 
individual rights.233  This is a key consideration because if a state 
receives the latitude to promote religious symbols in the public 
square, then it must be careful to guarantee the absolute individual 
rights of religious minorities.  In Lautsi II, the Grand Chamber 
approved Italy’s school environment for six reasons: (1) the 
crucifixes were not paired with “compulsory teaching about 
Christianity;” (2) Italy did not forbid its students from wearing 
religious apparel, such as “Islamic headscarves or other symbols”; 
(3) “alternative arrangements” were available for minority practices; 
(4) minority religious holidays were “often celebrated” in school; (5) 
“optional religious education” for other faiths “could be organized in 
schools;” and (6) officials were tolerant of minority religions and 
non-believers.234  A similarly appropriate environment is present in 
the United States, due to the robust free-exercise protections for 
minority religions present at all levels of government and in the 
                                                            
232 See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 899-900 
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Clause was not intended to apply 
to mere “governmental invocation[s] of God”). 
233 Lautsi & Others v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 
74 (2011). 
234 Id. para. 74. 
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courts. 
 
Second, the Grand Chamber considered whether the religious 
symbol related to the cultural identity of the community.235  This is a 
point that U.S. Supreme Court Justices have certainly made for 
decades about religion and culture in the United States, although 
some scholars remain skeptical that religious symbols can be part of 
a “cultural marketplace” with “everyone able to participate on an 
equal footing.”236  In the case of the crucifix in Italy, the Grand 
Chamber noted the “great diversity” between European nations “in 
the sphere of cultural and historical development.”237  Applying a 
wide margin of appreciation, the Court deferred to Italy’s view that, 
“the presence of crucifixes in State classrooms, being the result of 
Italy’s historical development, a fact which gave it not only a 
religious connotation but also an identity-linked one, now 
corresponded to a tradition which they considered it important to 
perpetuate.”238    
 
The U.S. Supreme Court should emulate this deference when 
considering the place of the symbols in the community that erected 
the religious display, just as it considered the history and tradition of 
a practice when upholding legislative prayer.239  Justice Breyer’s 
“legal judgment” theory in Van Orden v. Perry did something of this 
sort by focusing on the long history of the Ten Commandments 
monument erected at the Texas State Capitol.240  Further, as 
Professor Michael McConnell has argued, in a truly pluralistic 
culture, symbols will not be oppressive: 
 
                                                            
235 Id. paras. 67-70.  
236 Beaman, supra note 25, at 90 (arguing that, in this cultural space, 
“there is no evidence” that “[h]istorical privilege and power sedimentations” 
will disappear, “leaving a space in which ideas are debated and exchanged 
freely”). 
237 Lautsi & Others v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 
68 (2011). 
238 Id. para. 67. 
239 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); see also Town of 
Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).  
240 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700-02 (2005) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
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If a city displays many different 
cultural symbols during the course of 
the year, a nativity scene at Christmas 
or a menorah at Hannukah is likely to 
be perceived as an expression of 
pluralism rather than as an exercise in 
Christian or Jewish triumphalism.  If 
the curriculum is genuinely diverse, 
exposing children to religious ideas 
will not have the effect of 
indoctrination. . . .  The same is true of 
the public culture: opt-out rights 
should be freely accorded, but the 
general norm should be one of 
openness, diversity, and pluralism.241 
 
Third, the Grand Chamber looked at whether the religious 
symbol was “passive” (as opposed to “active” presumably).242  In 
other words, the Court was interested in the level of proselytizing 
furthered by the religious symbol.  The Court disagreed with the 
lower Chamber’s comparison of the crucifix in Lautsi to the Islamic 
headscarf in Dahlab, noting that “a crucifix on a wall is an 
essentially passive symbol [that] . . . cannot be deemed to have an 
influence on pupils comparable to that of didactic speech or 
participation in religious activities.”243  This Article previously 
criticized the Dahlab case as a negative example of intolerant 
secularism.244  The Grand Chamber’s attempt to distinguish it here 
does not ring true—a headscarf is essentially a passive display placed 
upon a person; thus, it should have been equally allowed in the Swiss 
classrooms.  While a teacher’s proselytizing words might be active, 
her passive headscarf is not.   
                                                            
241 McConnell, supra note 53, at 193. 
242 Lautsi & Others v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 
72 (2011). 
243 Id. The Grand Chamber viewed the facts of Dahlab as too different 
to be a relevant point of reference in the Lautsi case. Id. para. 73. 
244 See supra notes 112-117 & accompanying text (criticizing the 
Dahlab case). 
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Of the three factors considered by the Grand Chamber, this 
one comes with the most cautionary warning before being adopted 
by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Not all scholars agree that a 
passive/active distinction is valid when it comes to religious 
symbols.245  Moreover, this third factor could be problematic in the 
same way that the Supreme Court’s current Establishment Clause 
cases seek to determine how an “objective observer” might view a 
religious display246—a practice fraught with peril, as Justice Scalia 
pointed out.247  Still, perhaps this factor could serve well as a 
replacement to the objective observer analysis because it takes into 
consideration the depth of proselytization that might occur due to the 
presence of a publicly supported religious display.  Depending on the 
context, this factor might even weigh against an “active” monument 
such as the Ten Commandments, which the Supreme Court has 
concluded might “induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, 
perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments.”248  
D. Pluralistic Neutrality and Other Acknowledgments of Religion 
 As with the acknowledgment of religious symbols, the U.S. 
Supreme Court also struggled for consistency in cases involving 
                                                            
245 Beaman, supra note 25, at 88 (“Although passivity does not 
necessarily equate to ‘no meaning,’ the implication of the court’s conclusion in 
Lautsi II is that such a passive symbol does not equal indoctrination or teaching. 
The work of Riis and Woodhead would suggest otherwise.”). 
246 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (“The 
eyes that look to purpose belong to an ‘objective observer,’ one who takes 
account of the traditional external signs that show up in the ‘text, legislative 
history, and implementation of the statute,’ or comparable official act.”). 
247 See also id. at 901 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is an odd 
jurisprudence that bases the unconstitutionality of a government practice that 
does not actually advance religion on the hopes of the government that it would 
do so. But that oddity pales in comparison to the one invited by today’s analysis: 
the legitimacy of a government action with a wholly secular effect would turn 
on the misperception of an imaginary observer that the government officials 
behind the action had the intent to advance religion.”) (citation omitted). 
248 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (striking down Ten 
Commandments in a school environment); but see id. at 45 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Commandments had “secular significance” and 
should be allowed to be placed before students “with an appropriate statement of 
the document’s secular import”). 
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prayer, or religious expression, and public education.  While the 
Court has taken a remarkably pluralistic approach to legislative 
prayer, it has towed a stricter line in other areas.  In the wake of this 
confused religious jurisprudence, lower U.S. courts often have 
adopted strict neutrality as their default position, to the detriment of 
religious liberty, history, and tradition.  This section examines 
European Court cases involving religious expression and religious 
education that may provide insights for the Supreme Court. 
1. Public Prayer and Religious Expression 
The U.S. Supreme Court has spoken with conflicting voices 
about prayer and religious expression by public officials and state-
run organizations.  On the one hand, the Court—candidly admitting 
that its usual Establishment Clause tests are unsuited for dealing with 
legislative prayer—has developed a deferential “history and 
tradition” test that takes into account whether the Framers viewed a 
public religious practice as merely “a benign acknowledgment of 
religion’s role in society.”249  The Court has concluded that:  
 
The inclusion of a brief, ceremonial 
prayer as part of a larger exercise . . . 
is but a recognition that, since this 
Nation was founded and until the 
present day, many Americans deem 
that their own existence must be 
understood by precepts far beyond the 
authority of government to alter or 
define and that willing participation in 
civic affairs can be consistent with a 
brief acknowledgment of their belief 
in a higher power, always with due 
respect for those who adhere to other 
beliefs.250 
 
                                                            
249 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 U.S. 1811, 1819 (2014) (applying 
the history and tradition test to approve expressly sectarian prayers prior to city 
council meetings, if given by members of the community). 
250 Id. at 1827-28. 
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On the other hand, the Court has applied a non-deferential 
test in public schools to strike down prayers that boast a similar 
lineage in history and tradition.251  Thus, the Court has viewed a 
school’s authorization of a rabbi’s short, non-denominational 
graduation prayer as the equivalent of a “state-created orthodoxy [or 
a] state-sponsored religious exercise that puts at grave risk that 
freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that 
religious faith is real, not imposed.”252 In this area, the Court has 
embraced strict neutrality. 
 
In contrast, the European Court has never decided a case 
involving the propriety of prayer by a public official or prayer at 
official events.  The ECHR does not have an Establishment Clause 
and does not contemplate that mere prayer by a state actor or in a 
public ceremony could violate individual human rights.  Article 9 of 
the ECHR guarantees the “[f]reedom to manifest one’s religion or 
beliefs”253—it does not limit the manifestation of those beliefs by 
state officials.  This focus promotes true pluralism, which accepts the 
religious identity of all people and does not repress the expression of 
that identity, even by its public officials.  Indeed, “official religious 
expression may bolster religious freedom by affirming, if only 
symbolically, that religious beliefs are relevant to public life: that the 
public square is not naked of religion, and that religious arguments 
are part of the pattern of debate in a pluralistic society.”254   
 
While the issue of legislative or school prayer does not find 
its complement in the European Court’s jurisprudence, that Court has 
provided guidance in other areas involving religious expression and 
the actions of public officials.  Specifically, the European Court has 
decided several cases where the state has impaired religious 
expression or association—a situation much more likely to result in 
establishing a state religion than a few words spoken by a graduation 
speaker merely acknowledging the importance of faith in life’s 
                                                            
251 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (striking 
down student-initiated prayer before football game); see Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577, 577 (1992) (striking down non-denominational graduation prayer). 
252 Lee, 505 U.S. at 592. 
253 ECHR, supra note 7, art. 9.  
254 Berg, supra note 27, at 35. 
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special moments. A few case comparisons should illustrate three key 
points. 
 
First, public officials have the absolute right to religious 
belief and expression—a right not open to regulation by the state or 
its courts. In Buscarini and Others v. San Marino, the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court rejected a policy in San Marino—a 
tiny microstate located within the boundaries of Italy—that forced 
newly elected members of parliament to swear a religious oath “on 
the Holy Gospels,” as required since 1909.255  The European Court 
found that San Marino had violated Article 9 because the oath policy 
was “tantamount to requiring two elected representatives of the 
people to swear allegiance to a particular religion.”256  In this case, 
without the benefit of an Establishment Clause, the European Court 
applied a pluralistic neutrality rationale to reach essentially the same 
result as the U.S. Supreme Court in Torcaso v. Watkins, where the 
Justices rightly rejected Maryland’s requirement that its political 
officials affirm belief in God in order to serve public office.257  In 
both cases, the state improperly used its power to coerce public 
officials into accepting a state-approved creed.  The lesson of these 
decisions is that the state cannot force its officials to forfeit their 
religious rights simply because they have chosen to become public 
servants.  
 
Second, while public officials may believe and pray as they 
wish, their beliefs cannot translate into actions that impair the 
religious rights of others.  For instance, in Hasan and Chaush v. 
Bulgaria, the government replaced Hasan—the “Chief Mufti” of the 
Bulgarian Muslim Community—with a candidate who had 
previously held the post, and then the state refused to register the 
religious group led by Hasan.258  Rejecting Bulgaria’s claim that its 
                                                            
255 Buscarini v. San Marino, 1991-I Eur. Ct. H.R. As in Lautsi, the state 
attempted to win by draining any religious meaning from the oath.  The Court, 
however, rejected San Marino’s argument that the oath had “lost its original 
religious character.” Id. para. 32.  
256 Id. para. 34. 
257 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
258 Hasan v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000). 
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actions were merely “of a declarative nature” to help bring unity to 
the religious community, the Court found an Article 9 violation.259  
Similarly, in Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. 
Moldova, government officials refused to recognize what they 
believed to be a “schismatic” Orthodox Christian sect that would not 
reconcile with a larger, state-recognized Orthodox Church.260  The 
European Court concluded that these actions violated Article 9, 
finding the officials had improperly assessed “the legitimacy of 
religious beliefs.”261  Both of these cases are consistent with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 
which nullified a Georgia law that required a jury in a church 
property dispute to decide which side of the dispute was more 
faithful to the religion’s tenets.262  Other cases could also illustrate 
this comparison.263 
 
Third, public officials may not allow their personal religious 
beliefs to stand in the way of accommodating others in the exercise 
of their religion.  The classic example of this principle in the United 
States is the case of Sherbert v. Verner, where the Free Exercise 
Clause required a state to give unemployment benefits to a Seventh 
Day Adventist who was fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath 
                                                            
259 Id. para. 82. 
260 Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R.  
261 Id. para. 123. The violation occurred in a concededly difficult 
environment—Moldova had recently emerged from the Soviet Union and this 
dispute may have been a proxy clash between Russia and Romania. Id. para. 
111.     
262 Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). The Court found that “First 
Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is 
made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious 
doctrine and practice.” Id. at 449. 
263 Compare Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993) 
(finding a violation when public officials prosecuted a Jehovah’s Witness for 
proselytizing in an attempt to protect the Greek Orthodox majority religion), 
with Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (striking down a state statute 
that required licenses for those soliciting for religious purposes), and 
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 
150 (2002) (striking down an ordinance that required door-to-door religious 
advocates to obtain a permit).  
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day.264  In that case, it did not matter whether state unemployment 
officials accepted the legitimacy of the woman’s refusal to work 
based on her religion; the Supreme Court prohibited those officials 
from treating her refusal as “good cause” for dismissal.265   
 
Likewise, in the consolidated case of Eweida and Others v. 
The United Kingdom, the European Court held that state officials 
must at times accommodate certain religious practices, such as the 
wearing of a Christian cross.266  Nadia Eweida was an employee of 
British Airways—a private airline operating in the United Kingdom 
(U.K.)—who, as a Christian, wished to wear a cross necklace outside 
her uniform.267  Her co-applicant, Shirley Chaplin, was a Christian 
nurse working at a U.K. state hospital who was ordered to take off 
her cross necklace when the hospital mandated new uniforms with a 
V-neck.268  Although Eweida worked for a private employer, the 
European Court found that Article 9 included in it a “positive 
obligation” on public officials to “sufficiently secure” individual 
religious rights.269  In Eweida’s case, British Airways had changed 
its policy based on public opinion and had not presented a strong 
enough reason to prevent the cross display, especially where the 
company had already accommodated other religious symbols, such 
as Islamic headscarves.270  In Chaplin’s case, however, the cross 
posed a safety hazard in the hospital environment—a much stronger 
reason for this rule.271  In accord with the European Court’s wide 
margin of appreciation, it found that the U.K. officials were best 
positioned to determine safety policies on a hospital ward.272 
 
In sum, a more pluralistic neutrality principle would permit 
                                                            
264 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
265 Id. 
266 See Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. 
H.R.  
267 Id. paras. 9-12. 
268 Id. paras. 18-20. 
269 Id. paras. 84, 90. 
270 Id. paras. 9, 94. 
271 Id. para. 99. 
272 See Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. 
H.R. at paras. 99-100. 
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public officials and offices to acknowledge religion with prayer and 
other religious expression, within reason.  This would not violate the 
Establishment Clause either—as the legislative prayer cases 
demonstrate—especially outside the context of the public schools.  
“The Framers were indeed opposed to coercion of religious worship 
by the National Government; but, as their own sponsorship of non-
sectarian prayer in public events demonstrates, they understood that 
‘[s]peech is not coercive; the listener may do as he likes.’”273  The 
Supreme Court should follow Europe’s lead in focusing on the 
actions of public officials, while permitting maximum flexibility in 
their religious expression. 
2. Religion and Public Education 
The role of religion in public education is the final topic to 
consider in this Article.  As discussed in the prior section, the 
Supreme Court continues to turn a harsh eye toward school-
sponsored prayer.  In fact, the Court typically applies its strictest 
neutrality in cases involving religion in elementary or secondary 
public education.  This repeatedly has been the case in the post-
Everson Establishment Clause era, with the Court finding it 
unconstitutional for schools to pray before class,274 to read from the 
Bible,275 to prohibit instruction on evolution,276 to teach creation 
science,277 to display the Ten Commandments,278 and to pray at 
                                                            
273 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 642 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(quoting American Jewish Congress v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 132 (7th Cir. 
1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)). 
274 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (no moment of silence 
intended for voluntary prayer); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (no 
state-composed school prayers). 
275 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (no starting 
school day with a Bible reading). 
276 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (no law prohibiting 
the teaching of evolution). 
277 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (no law requiring 
the teaching of creation science). 
278 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (no law requiring 
display of Ten Commandments). 
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school events.279  In fact, the Court has approved religious-related 
practices only where schools have blatantly discriminated against 
religion-based clubs280 or where they have authorized students time 
during the school day to receive private religious instruction off-
campus, as in Zorach v. Clauson. 281 
 
Not surprisingly, the European Court’s jurisprudence is more 
tolerant of public religious education—concerned mostly that the 
state conduct classes in a pluralistic manner with respect for the 
beliefs of students and parents.  This makes sense: if religion is good 
for society, then the state should be able to encourage morality, 
pluralism, and religious practice through its education system, as 
publicly run schools did for centuries in the United States until the 
Supreme Court ended the practice in the 1960s.  Just as important, 
however, is the corollary principle that students should have the right 
to opt out of religious education, if they so desire.   
 
The Supreme Court can gain insight from European Court 
cases in this area, and should realize that its Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence has room for moderation by applying a more 
pluralistic neutrality principle.  For instance, in Folgerø and Others 
v. Norway, the Grand Chamber of the European Court considered the 
validity of a Christian public education class, in a nation where the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church is the state-established religion.282  
Norway had always offered a Christianity class in its public schools; 
however, in the 1990s it made that class more pluralistic, 
encouraging open-mindedness.283  As a result, Norway tightened its 
requirements on when a student could be exempt from participating 
in that class.  Specifically, parents must now provide a note 
                                                            
279 See Lee v. William, 505 U.S. 577 (no graduation prayer by guest 
speaker); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (no student-led 
prayer prior to football game). 
280 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) 
(requiring fair treatment of school clubs). 
281 See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (permitting release off-
campus for religious instruction); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 
(1948) (forbidding release to on-campus classrooms for religious instruction). 
282 Folgerø and Others v. Norway, 2007-III, Eur. Ct. H.R.  
283 Id. paras. 9, 15. 
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explaining in detail why their student needed the exemption.284  
Some parents complained, however, that the exemption requirements 
were improper and onerous.285 
 
In its judgment against Norway, the European Court affirmed 
the right of nations to teach religion in their public schools, subject to 
student exemption.286  The Court applauded Norway’s attempt to 
transform a purely religious class into one that better stressed 
pluralistic principles.287  The Court agreed, at least in theory, that the 
state could more strictly enforce attendance at a truly objective 
pluralistic class.288  It faulted Norway’s class, however, for not 
presenting Christianity in a sufficiently objective manner, and for 
containing blatantly religious activities, such as prayer.289  Thus, 
Norway’s exemption criteria was too strict, in light of the class’ 
religious content.290  The Court believed that the stricter note 
requirement improperly obligated parents to reveal potentially 
intimate details about their private lives, and it worried that the state 
might still deny exemptions.291  The Grand Chamber concluded that 
the ECHR required Norway to grant full exemptions to every student 
who objected to the class, without resort to an onerous exemption 
process.292  The Court decided related issues in cases from Poland293 
                                                            
284 Id. para. 25.  
285 Id. paras. 51-52. 
286 Id. para. 84. 
287 Id. paras. 88, 102. 
288 Folgerø and Others v. Norway, 2007-III, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 89. 
289 Id. paras. 90-95. 
290 Id. paras. 97-99. 
291 Id. para. 100. 
292 Id. para. 102. 
293 See Grzelak v. Poland, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. In this case, non-
religious students who opted out of a religious class in the Polish public schools 
received no grade on their report card for that class. The European Court found 
that this placed a black mark on these students’ records that Poland must correct 
by offering an alternative ethics class; by taking the class off all transcripts; or 
by assigning the students a harmless grade in it. Id. 
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and Turkey.294   
 
The Supreme Court should learn from these European 
decisions that religion can play a role in public education and that 
progressive nations can respect individual rights while providing 
religious courses to achieve valid societal interests.  The Supreme 
Court in Zorach saw the benefit to society in permitting religious 
education during public school hours, although the Court did require 
that all religion classes be conducted off-campus by private 
teachers.295  Further, the Court has stated that the Bible “may 
constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, 
civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like.”296  This 
analysis is not too far removed from the European Court’s cases in 
this area.  While the Establishment Clause might not permit the state 
to expend significant tax dollars on a doctrinal religion course, surely 
a more pluralistic neutrality principle would allow the Court to 
rethink much of its public school precedents.  
 
Why not allow schools to encourage willing students to pray 
during the school day and at school events?  A society that values 
pluralism should not teach students that prayer is a dangerous 
practice to be avoided in public at all costs.  And what harm can 
come from allowing schools to present alternative theories to 
evolution, if done in a clinical and non-proselytizing manner?  
Pluralistic societies should not shelter students from theories on the 
origin of life solely because they find their genesis in the Book of 
Genesis, or in a philosophy that recognizes an Intelligent Designer.  
                                                            
294 See Mansur Yalçin and Others v. Turkey, 2014-II Eur. Ct. H.R. In 
this case, members of the Alevi Islamic sect complained about Turkey’s 
religious education class, which was required for all Muslims, but exemptable 
for Jews and Christians. They claimed the course was steeped in Sunni Islamic 
doctrine, which was offensive to the Alevi. The European Court found that 
Turkey did not provide sufficient exemptions, and that almost all European 
states provided some sort of “exemption mechanism, giving the opportunity to 
take substitute material or leaving them free to register for a religion course.” Id. 
para. 76. 
295 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). 
296 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963)). 
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Finally, why not encourage students to read from scriptural works as 
a source of inspiration or reflection?  Pluralism should be as willing 
to expose students to the works of Jesus and Mohammed, as it is to 
encourage them with the wisdom of Ghandi or Maya Angelou.  In 
short, if the Supreme Court were to adopt a more pluralistic 
neutrality principle, it would see that its modern Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence in this area has been unnecessarily strict and 
ultimately harmful to the values of pluralism. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Traditionally, religion has brought great benefits to society by 
developing culture and morals, and by providing a common source 
of unity to diverse peoples.  Although the influence of religion is 
waning in Europe, the mark of faith on that continent’s history and 
culture has given its courts a unique perspective that can benefit the 
U.S. Supreme Court in its quest to interpret the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment.  Case law from the European Court of Human 
Rights demonstrates to the Supreme Court how a pluralistic 
neutrality principle can enrich the American society and harness the 
value of faith in the public sphere, while at the same time retaining 
the vigorous protection of individual religious rights. 
 
The unfortunate alternative to a jurisprudence built around 
pluralistic neutrality is the inevitability of intolerant secularism—an 
increasingly militant separation of religious ideals from the public 
life, leading ultimately to a repressive society that has no room in its 
government for religious citizens.  Under that regime, adherents of 
both majority and minority religions suffer for the cause of secular 
values.  The results of intolerant secularism are seen in a recent series 
of negative cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights, 
which largely are a product of the deference the Court must give to 
secular nations under its margin of appreciation doctrine.  These 
cases illustrate how highly secularized nations can trample the 
fundamental rights of religious citizens for the sake of secular 
ideals—preventing these peace-loving citizens from dressing in 
religious garb, engaging in age-old sacrificial rituals, and following 
their consciences.  The Supreme Court can avoid this type of 
intolerance in the United States by distancing itself from the principle 
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of strict neutrality that the Court often has repeated in its 
Establishment Clause cases. 
 
A better path for the Supreme Court is to emulate a series of 
positive cases from the European Court of Human Rights that 
demonstrate pluralistic values.  These cases show the value that 
religion can bring to public life, and the ability of progressive nations 
to welcome religious diversity into the public square without 
harming individual rights.  If the Supreme Court embraces this 
European-style principle of pluralistic neutrality, it can continue 
down its current path with regard to public aid to religion through 
generally available, neutral funding programs.  More significantly, 
accepting pluralistic neutrality will result in a moderation of the 
Supreme Court’s religious display cases, allowing the state to 
promote meaningful symbols that are part of the community’s 
identity and sense of culture.  Similarly, a pluralistic neutrality 
principle will strengthen the benefits of other public 
acknowledgments of religion—such as prayer by public officials and 
religious values in public education.   
 
The net result of this shift in the Supreme Court’s focus—
without sacrificing the value and purpose of the Establishment 
Clause—would be to promote the cause of religious pluralism in the 
United States and to enhance the dignity of the American people to 
live out their religious faith in the community insofar as they choose 
to do.  This can only be done, however, if the Supreme Court reforms 
its view of the Religion Clauses and learns a few lessons from its 
European brethren about the blessings of a more pluralistic principle 
of neutrality. 
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